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The clash between South Africa's dual need of a new political identity and economic viability 
reflects not only the difficulty in conducting a traditional foreign policy with a strong 
ideological overlay but also has spurred the debate over whether her foreign policy is to be 
conducted on the basis of expediency or principle. This study argues that although the shift to 
a post-apartheid society has created the context for South African foreign policy to be shaped 
by a new culture of human rights, it remains an interest-based pragmatic activity rather than 
an exercise in the projection of ethical values or ideological principles. It seems that the 
African National Congress (ANC)-led government has not yet resolved the basic 
contradictions that have bedevilled its international thinking since it came into power. Faced 
with this dilemma, South Africa is often reduced to straddling the fence by half-heartedly 
supporting principles on one occasion (as in its relationship with the Republic of China), and 
on another pursuing its economic interests (as her intention to sell arms to the People's 
Republic of China attests). The government's basic goal of developing fruitful political and 
economic linkages without sacrificing the principles which underpin wider policy has proved 
elusive. The central proposition of this study is that the defming parameters of South African 
foreign policy have remained largely indeterminate because of the realities of the conflicting 
interests posed by its domestic and external concerns. In essence, the inability to reconcile 
primary foreign policy goals (preservation of national economic interest) with new foreign 
policy aspirations (promotion of human rights and peace through the pursuit of justice and 
fair-play) reflects a tense ambivalence in the founding principles of post apartheid South 
African foreign policy. 
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Introduction 
How can I pierce the impenetrable blank of the future? 
I feel thy ominous greatness, evil as well as good; 
I watch thee, advancing, absorbing the present, transcending the past; 
I see thy lighting and thy shadows shadowing, as if the entire globe; 
But I do not take to define thee - hardly to comprehend thee ... (Marshall, 1960: 268) 
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Anyone who has ever dealt with foreign policy would appreciate these lines from Whitman. 
As technological advances reinforce the idea of a 'global village' in an increasingly 
interdependent world, foreign policy assumes new significance: the values and principles that 
we promote through foreign policy will not only determine our survival and prospects in the 
international arena but also will shape our relationships with other actors. In this sense, the 
values and principles that drive foreign policy are especially critical to a South Africa which 
has reclaimed its position on the international stage after a period of apartheid isolation. 
Whilst apartheid paralysed the scope and dimension of South Africa's foreign relations, 
democracy has opened the world to her. South Africa began her new incursion into the 
international arena in the enviable position of having the goodwill of every other country in 
the world. Amongst other things, this was reflected by the resolution adopted by the United 
Nations (UN) in December 1995 to write off South Africa's debt to the organisation (Minty, 
1996: 25). The new democracy was touted as possessing substantial moral capital, a rather 
precious commodity in present world politics. In this regard, South Africa had the 
wherewithal to bring leadership to individual issues such as human rights. There were high 
hopes that she would draw on her domestic experience to help chart new directions in the 
international relations of the twenty-first century. 
Writing in 'Foreign Affairs', Nelson Mandela spelt out "four pillars" of the future foreign 
policy of South Africa (Mandela, 1993: 2, electronic version). Of these, the greatest attention 
was paid by Mandela to the issue of human rights and to the promotion of South Africa's 
economic interests. However, subsequent developments have proven that these two criteria 
are not easy to combine. South Africa has been slow to take advantage of all the 
opportunities that her new political dispensation has accorded her. This is due, in part, to her 
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new responsibilities (both external and internal) which appear antithetical. 
Nonetheless, the talks aimed at the extension of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty held in 
New York in early 1995, showed the potential that South Africa's foreign policy possessed 
(Bischoff, 1995: 10). The occasion gave South Africa its first major chance to occupy a 
diplomatic high ground. The resource she brought to the meeting was her stature: she was the 
first UN member state to shed her nuclear weapons unilaterally. Unfortunately, South Africa 
did not capitalise on her new role. At the very moment of opportunity, visionary liberation 
rhetoric was jettisoned in favour of policies that were more cautious and pragmatic. The 
naive assumptions which guided South African foreign policy from the advent of the 
transitional process in 1990 to the election of 1994, including the purported influence of the 
so-called 'Mandela factor,' were for the most part dispelled and later replaced by a more 
realistic assessment of South Africa's position in the world. South Africa came to appreciate 
the dilemma of foreign policy decisions which confront governments that emphasize the 
importance and intrinsic value of human rights, a dilemma which is exacerbated when the 
reality on the ground includes the challenge to promote national economic interests. 
It will be argued that although the shift to a post apartheid society has created the context for 
South African fmeign policy to be shaped by a new culture of human rights, it remains an 
interest-based pragmatic activity rather than an exercise in the projection of ethical values or 
ideological principles. It seems that the African National Congress (ANC)-led government 
has not yet resolved the basic contradictions that have bedevilled its international thinking 
since it came into power. 
Faced with moral choice and values of general human interest on one side and particular 
national interests on the other, the South African government finds itself between a devil and 
a hard rock. By selling out to the devil it loses its integrity and moral standing, by chipping at 
the hard rock it risks losing the support of the people who voted it into power. There is a 
sense of de javu; a cruel irony denoted by the fact that as in the past, bread and butter 
domestic issues continue to frustrate and complicate foreign policy (albeit in a new way). 
The clash betWeen South Africa's basic needs of political identity and economic viability 
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reflects the difficulty in conducting a traditional foreign policy with a strong ideological 
overlay and has spurred the debate over whether her foreign policy is to be conducted on the 
basis of expediency or principle. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DF A) alludes to its 
vision as the "effective promotion of South Africa's national interests and values abroad" 
(www.gov.zaldept/index.html). How do we carry out our new role as a humane example and 
champion of justice in a world in which national interest is often the final arbiter? How do 
we reconcile ends and means, principles and survival? How do we keep secure both our 
existence and our values? Faced with this dilemma, South Africa is often reduced to 
straddling the fence by half-heartedly supporting principles on one occasion (as in its 
relationship with the People's Republic of China), and on another keeping its hands off 
altogether (as the handling of the Zimbabwean crisis attests). The government's basic goal of 
developing fruitful political and economic linkages without sacrificing the principles which 
underpin wider policy has proved elusive. 
It becomes evident that if South Africa is to hold onto what little moral influence she has, she 
will have to move away from a mercantilist-orientated foreign policy laced with narrowly 
defined economic considerations. However, a foreign policy which champions human rights 
in absolutist terms is also not feasible in the present competitive international arena. So 
where does this leave South African foreign policy? My central proposition is that the 
defining parameters of South African foreign policy have remained largely indeterminate 
because ofthe realities ofthe conflicting interests posed by its domestic and external 
concerns. In essence, the inability to reconcile primary foreign policy goals (preservation of 
national economic interest) with new foreign policy aspirations (promotion of human rights 
and peace through the pursuit of justice and fair-play) reflects a tense ambivalence in the 
founding principles of post apartheid South African foreign policy. In this study, my primary 
aim is to assess South African foreign policy by contextualizing this ambivalence. 
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Chapter One 
Defining Foreign Policy 
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Some analysts view foreign policy as an instrument through which a country and its 
government structures conduct relations with the rest of the world - politically, economically 
and socially. It is the art of building for the long term, the careful nurturing of relationships, 
the elaboration of policies that enhance available options while constraining those of potential 
opponents. In this sense, it is the "output of the state into the global system" (Russet and 
Staff, 1992: 179). Foreign policy implies a "conscious image of what is or ought to be the 
country's place in the world, or some general guiding principles or attitudes determining or 
influencing decisions on specific issues" (Wallace, 1971: 11). Whilst some regard foreign 
policy as a set of actual measures taken by leaders representing national entities with specific 
interests and needs, many others consider it the pursuit of universal purposes in a global field 
of human relations. Moreover, there are those who regard it as a "boundary" activity (Evans 
and Newnham, 1990: 123). They suggest that those who engage in the making of policy 
straddle two environments: an internal/domestic environment and an external/international 
one. Policy makers and the policy system itself stand at the juncture between the two and 
must therefore seek to mediate between them (Evans and Newnham, 1990: 123). 
The analysis of foreign policy involves an understanding of both the domestic and 
international environments and the relation of one to the other. This presents a particular 
challenge; in Rosenau's words, "the foreign policy undertaking is the most delicate of 
political actions and the most fragile of political relationships" (Rosenau, 1971: 93). The 
domestic environment forms the background context against which policy is made and 
reflects factors such as prevailing ideology and national interests. The international 
environment is where policy is actually implemented. 
In essence, we can deduce that any country's foreign policy represents how its domestic 
values and priorities are translated onto the international stage. It is the link between 
activities inside a state and the world environment outside it. J ames Rosenau notes that "the 
analysis of foreign policy is a bridging discipline that takes as its focus of study the bridges 
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that whole systems called nation-states build to link themselves and their subsystems to even 
more encompassing international systems of which they are a part" (Rosenau, 1987: 1). The 
ambiguity that characterizes South African foreign policy, more or less, can be attributed to 
her inability to reconcile both her external and internal interests. 
Foreign policy, in Morgenthau's famous formulation, is about the "national interest defined in 
terms of power;" therefore, its proper or 'normal' conduct requires the virtual exclusion of 
variables such as ideological values or moral principles (Morgenthau, 1951: 242). 'Normal' 
states conduct their policies with due regard to geo-political realities and maximise their gain 
potential by eschewing potentially divisive and, therefore, weakening, internal ideological 
considerations (Evans, 1991: 7). In foreign affairs all is relative - relative to one's own needs, 
position, dangers, hopes and purposes. In essence, the making of foreign policy is founded on 
ego-centricity: given the character of the contemporary international system, of sovereign 
states and the conventions upon which they rest, foreign policy can only make sense in so far 
as it is calculated to advance, or at least to defend, the interests of the state concerned. Even 
where foreign policy is projected in moral or social terms of general relevance and validity-
such as peace, human prosperity and political democracy - and even where it entails some 
sacrifice or surrender on the part of the society in whose name it is advanced, it must be 
fundamentally self-seeking to be politically tenable. For example, it has been argued that 
peace in Zimbabwe (and Southern Africa in general), is in the interest of peace in South 
Africa. 
Furthermore, it should also be noted that economic needs are an important motivating factor 
in a state's foreign policy. There are strong pressures generated in the state's political system 
to satisfy individual or group economic needs through foreign policy. In addition, the 
economy of a state is fundamental to its capabilities and, therefore, to its power vis-a-vis 
other states, i.e. its ability to get other states to do what it desires. Another source of foreign 
policy is the cultural, psychological and/or ideological need ofthe state for prestige and status 
in the world. 
One may conclude that foreign policy is a multidimensional set of policies, objectives, 
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principles, strategies and plans which cannot easily be packaged into a neatly described 
'fonnula'. It is indeed questionable whether there is such a thing as a single, coherent and 
rational foreign policy. It may be argued that we are really dealing with a series of disjointed, 
finite and often mutually conflicting policies emerging from different governmental levels 
and divisions that are responding piecemeal to their own narrowly-focussed problems 
(Couloumbis and Wolfe, 1990: 115). In this sense, the ambiguity that characterizes South 
African foreign policy is not necessarily pernicious. 
Whatever the case it should be noted that states do not make foreign policy, governments do. 
In foreign policy, as in domestic policy, they take their decisions under pressure from a 
number of different sources including events and even time (these external influences are 
discussed in chapter 3) and make their plans within certain frameworks. South African 
foreign policy will be assessed in tenns of the traditional realist - idealist dichotomy and it is 
to a discussion of this framework that we now turn. 




South African Reality or 'Rainbow Nation' Rhetoric": Realism verus Idealism in 
South African Foreign Policy 
The history of modem political thought is the story of a contest between two schools which 
differ fundamentally in their conception of the nature of man, society and politics 
(Morgenthau, 1960: 246). Politics operates in a world of states but it is also a world of 
human beings, and it will often be difficult to reconcile the demands and claims of both. 
Previously, idealism Irealism was a battle of the mind, fought by and large outside the 
political arena (Wolfers, 1967: 81). Not until Woodrow Wilson set out to transform utopia 
into reality did it become a political issue of the first magnitude. Nowhere does the 
contradiction between professed ethical principles and actual behaviour appear so patent and 
universal as in the conduct of foreign relations; and human rights is an arena in which the 
intellectual chall~nge for the two worlds, the one of ideas and the other of implementation, is 
at its most compelling. A 'tug of war' between 'realists' who were concerned with attracting 
foreign investment, and 'idealists' who wanted South Africa to take the moral high ground 
would become a steady feature of South African foreign policy. The following section 
analyses the merit of both realist and the so-called idealist paradigms and attempts to 
understand South African foreign policy within this dichotomy. 
1) THE REALIST ARGUMENT 
At the-normative core of realism is the quest for national security and state survival. Any 
government, whether democratically controlled or not, will pursue such interests in, what 
power-politics theorists see as, the anarchic world of "each against all" (Russet and Starr, 
1992: 187). States have one primary goal; first and foremost, to preserve themselves and here 
the end often justifies the means. Therefore, the central proposition of realists is that the 
purpose of statecraft is national survival in a hostile environment and the acquisition of power 
is regarded as the proper, rational and inevitable goal of foreign policy. To seek power in 
order to promote one's interests is to follow the basic dictates ofthe 'laws' of nature 
(Couloumbis and Wolfe, 1990: 7). 
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Realist theory also stresses the role of national interest in determining state behaviour. In 
realist thought humans are characterized as being preoccupied with their own well-being in 
their competitive relations with each other. There is no global 'nationalism,' no state of mind 
in which "the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be due to mankind" - loyalty to one's 
nation proves to be superior to loyalty to such abstract and distant concepts as humanity or the 
human race (Duchacek and Thompson, 1960: 30). It is argued that each state must act with a 
single mind and single will and in this respect, they resemble the princes of the Renaissance 
about which Machiavelli wrote. Like them, states are supposed to be completely separate 
from each other, with no affinities or bonds of community interfering in their egotistical 
pursuit of power. They are competitors for power, engaged in a continuous and inescapable 
struggle for surVival. This accords with the 'pure power' model of realists which maintains 
that when countries are engaged in a race to enhance their power, they could be expected to 
align themselves in disrespect of earlier friendships or ideological affinities. For example, the 
South African government abandoned its ties with a democratic Taiwan - which had 
contributed t6 its first election campaign as well as a number of development programmes -
in favour of relations with China which could be a powerful ally in terms of both its global 
political and economic might. 
A government's foreign policy may concern itself with values of justice and fairness only to 
the extent th'~.t it is in harmony with the national interest and does not interfere with the power , -
obi.e.ctive. Realists posit that the moral rules that apply to individuals do not apply to states 
whose relations should be governed by considerations of national interest not of morality (The 
Economist, 4December 1997: 2, electronic version). For instance, Machiavelli and 
Machiavellianism have stood for a doctrine that places princes and sovereign · states under the 
niTe~ not of ordinary morality, but of the 'reason of state' which is considered an amoral 
I 
principle peculiar to the realm of politics (Wolfers, 1967: 48). Realists assert that regardless 
ofthe moral constraints that bind our interpersonal behaviour, international politics is so 
, 
anarchic that mere self-preservation requires the abandonment of moral inhibitions (Russet 
I 
and Staff, 1992: 360). In addition, for most of the newer nations, the margin oftheir 
resources, even broadly conceived, is barely sufficient for national survival. Consequently, 
the pursuit of a common good is a lUXury they cannot afford to strive for with profound 
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commitment. The basic point is that for many countries which lack the means to conduct 
these crusades of' global meliorism,' the abandonment of their own interests in the service of 
others may ~ot only be expensive but also prohibitive. 
Realists maintain that the nation's interests, dispassionately perceived, should guide 
statesmen (Wolfers, 1967: 35). They posit that it would be disastrous if countries sought to 
build their foreign policies on the quicksands of emotion, especially today when emotions are 
at the mercy of the mass media. One arrives at the cynical conclusion that morality has no 
place in international politics: all sovereign states are compelled by the 'system' to play the 
evil game of power politics. As a consequence, the main springs of state action and 
behaviour revolve around considerations of power and national interest rather than ethics and 
universalism. It is believed that excessive emphasis on abstract principles rather than stark 
realities leads to ·an inability to comprehend and control international events. Realists 
contend that idealistic rhetoric remains outside the gates of practical application: "it is one of 
the very few truisms of world politics that neither ideological affinity nor emotional 
attachment will preserve special interests for long unless they are firmly grounded in a 
bedrock of mutual interest" (Evans, 1991: 12). They insist that policies based on such 
'fallacies' are bound to fail because "these supposedly absolute and universal principles were 
not principles at all but the unconscious reflections of national policy based on a particular 
interpretation ofthe national interest at a particular time" (Wolfers, 1967: 36). 
The idea that power politics is beyond morality is not new. It is interesting to note that all 
successful statesmen from Richelieu to Churchill have made the national interest the ultimate 
standard of their policies, whereas none of the great moralists in international affairs has 
attained his goals (Russell, 1990: 103). This leads one to conclude that realists are immune 
from human rights concerns, except as a possible lever against an adversary state. 
Nevertheless, it ,,:,ould be as difficult to argue that Woodrow Wilson was acting on behalf of 
specific American interests when he struggled to get the Covenant of the League of Nations 
into the Versailles Treaty or that Lenin, after becoming head of the Russian government, 
placed its power and prestige exclusively in the service of national (as opposed to world 
revolutionary, at the time, Communist) objectives (Wolfers, 1967: 80). Although Lenin and 
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Wilson were motivated to an exceptional degree by revolutionary or ideological fervour and 
were able to inject a universalist element into the policy of their respective countries, events 
in their own lifetimes demonstrated the persistent predominance of the concern with strictly 
national interests. Indeed, it was not long before the Soviet Union, following its Czarist 
predecessors was to struggle to keep the Dardanelles open to Soviet shipping and before the 
United States was to refuse tojoin the League of Nations (Wolfers, 1967: 80). Is South 
Africa doomed to the same fate? 
Scholars of international relations have been wary of moralising because of their awareness of 
the diversity of beliefs within the system (Vincent, 1994: 219). They aver that it is hubristic 
to try to export western ideas of freedom to places with different traditions and levels of 
development (an important point to bear in mind when it comes to China). This is 
tantamount to arguing that we have no interest in Bosnia, so let them slaughter one another. 
Indeed, it is easier to see human rights as necessarily undermining rather than reinforcing the 
international system which is built on the sovereignty of states rather than the rights of 
individuals. Realists contend that the internal affairs of other states are not the proper 
business of foreigners. Once that rule is broken, they say the door is opened to all sorts of 
unnecessary disputes. There is no reason to argue with another country if it presents no threat 
to your security and is prepared to exist with you peacefully. 
However, a sophisticated realist would acknowledge that decisions in foreign policy have to 
take moral considerations into account although it would be argued that the moral dimension 
should not be allowed to dictate policy. Indeed, if the utility of every trade agreement had to 
be measured in terms of an abstract standard of human rights, then relatively few of South 
Africa's potential trading partners would pass, and in a global system based on a hierarchical 
ordering of economic development, the drive for growth by developing countries has often 
taken precedence over human rights and democracy building. It has been argued that South 
Africa's philosophy on international relations has evolved over time and there are no 
compelling reasons for the country's foreign policy to be ideologically inspired (Dietrichsen, 
1994: 213). It is common for a country's foreign policy and all related policy issues to be 
based on the interests of that country and South Africa should be no exception. 
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The ANC, in the transition from liberation movement to government, will have to cast off the 
rhetoric and ideological preferences built up in the days of Cold War politics, and embrace a 
political and economic pragmatism which would have been an unthinkable deviation in the 
late 1980's (Evans, 1991: 11). The demands of its own internal constituency, reinforced by its 
understandable fear of being overtaken by events, combine to place the organisation under 
great duress with respect to sustaining traditional foreign policy perspectives. The difficult 
trek down from the moral high ground of exile politics is in part motivated by an urgent need 
to meet the minimal expectations of those whose demands and votes have brought the present 
government to power. South Africa has a limited capacity to pursue additional higher 
activities due to daunting social needs and budgetary constraints which influence priorities at 
home. The moment contributions to international and other organisations grows and 
humanitarian ventures begin to involve domestic political costs, the pressure to curtail them is 
likely to be overwhelming. In the end, what South Africa does cannot be determined by 
principle alone. 
Nevertheless, it has been difficult for realists to adapt to an interdependent world system. The 
more transnational politics becomes, the less relevant (and effective) are policies based on 
one-sided promotion of the national interest. 
IT) THE IDEALIST ARGUMENT 
. , 
Idealists posit, contrary to realist assumptions, that states are not unitary actors with a single 
I 
purpose; there are certain core values (such as peace and prosperity) or goals that most 
citizens across borders share to some degree (a harmony of interests may be temp,marily 
obscured by the atavism of power politics in general). Idealists maintain that although power 
and national interests matter, so do common norms and institutions. States are important, but 
so are human beings. Idealism is a horizontal approach, shifting attention away from the 
vertical divisions of human society which are symbolised by the sovereignty of states, 
towards the various strata of social need which cut across national dividing lines (Duchacek 
and Thompson, 1960: 609). President Woodrow Wilson envisioned and declared that in the 
new age, "national purposes have fallen more and more into the background and the common 
purpose of enlightened mankind has taken their place ... " (Niebuhr, 1960: 210). According to 
Immanuel Kant: 
the rights of men must be held sacred, however much sacrifice it may cost the ruling 
power. On~ cannot compromise here and seek the middle course of a pragmatic 
conditional law between the morally right and the expedient...All politics must bend 
its knee before the right... (Kant, 1957: 46). 
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Nevertheless, idealists are criticised for their utopian conception of events and actions; it is 
argued that they do not understand the realities that constrain human choice (Viotti and 
Kauppi, 1994: 583). Idealists would respond that although the immediate needs of self-
preservation place limits on the extent to which the pursuit of higher goals are rational under 
given circumstances, having no other guide but opportunism makes for a dangerous situation 
(Wolfers, 1967: 76). Pursuing one's own fulfilment at the expense of others would lead to 
chaos and anarchy. No one can escape the fact that we are a single humanity and that all 
countries have some interest in ensuring that tomorrow's world is not plunged into flames 
against which no one's house is fireproof (Goodwin, 1974: 24). 
Despite the continued strength of nationalist sentiment in all parts of the world, there is no 
reason to assume that people only value national benefits. I They often attach a great deal of 
value to a good record of internatio~al collaboration and applaud a leader who takes risks for 
the goodwill, the amity, or the interests of other nations. In his first speech to the US Senate, 
President Harry S. Truman declared that "the breaking of peace anywhere is the concern of 
peace-loving nations everywhere"(Niebuhr, 1960: 188). Therefore, to say that the field of 
international politics is reserved for selfishness, brutality, self-righteousness, or umestrained 
ambition for power is not only cyilical but manifestly umealistic. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed as universal precisely because 
the founders ofthe UN organisation and the nations ofthe world who joined h~nds to fight 
the scourge of fascism, understood that our human world was an interdependent whole 
(Nelson Mandela's address at the 53Td UN General Assembly, 1998). A human rights basis to 
foreign policy is arguably demanded by intemationallaw principles. Just as a country's 
accession to the UN Charter (which SA signed in 1945) imposes a legal obligation on states 
to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, there is corresponding legql obligation on 
states not to encourage or condone the actions of others in violating those human tights 
(Seymour, 1996: 14). The problem is that it is merely an obligation; it remains in the realm 
of pious but unenforceable wishes. 
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The problem with realism is that it stresses foreign policy's limits rather than its magnitude. 
One wonders whether South Africa's leaders will have the vision and the courage to defy the 
inertia of orthodox prescriptions regarding foreign policy or whether they will maintain that 
"the values of the market are supreme and its instruments and mechanisms, an ineluctable 
force, in the face of whose power all those who aspire towards human dignity must bow in 
respectful obeisance"(Nelson Mandela's address at the XII NAM Summit, 1998). It is 
interesting to examine the extent to which the South African foreign policy establishment is 
capable of taking its cue from theories of 'complex interdependence' rather than 'political 
realism' as guiding paradigms in confronting the new operational environment opening up 
before them. 
President Mandela's address to the US Congress in 1995 challenged realist notions of 
international relations: 
In an age such as this ... much revision will have to be done of ideas that have seemed 
as stable as the rocks, including such concepts as sovereignty and national interest. 
What we speak of is the evolution of the objective world, which inexorably says to 
all of us that we are human together or nothing at all (Seymour, 1996: 4). 
It was observed that South Africa's foreign relations would be based on "our belief that 
human rights should be the core concern of international relations, and we are ready to play a 
role in fostering peace and prosperity in the world we share with the community of nations" 
(Mandela, 1993: 6, electronic version). Foreign policy beckons South Africa's people to 
international service so that the country may fulfill its calling as a responsible global citizen 
and it summons all South Africans to think beyond the immediate (Dietrichsen, 1994: 220). 
In this sense, th~ focus on idealism requires the government not to give up its sovereignty but 
to acquire benefits for citizens which were hitherto unavailable beyond its own borders. 
Such conduct would not necessarily reduce the government's power to defend its citizens; 
rather it would expand their competence to serve them. It may well be something of an 
exaggeration to say that in South Africa's post-apartheid, post-Cold War period "Kant may 
have the edge on Machiavelli," but the fact remains that in a political culture characterized by 
the disutility of force and a heightened awareness of communal, internationally-respected 
norms ofbe4aviol,!r? collectivist notions of reciprocity and restraint, have a longer security 
shelf-life than individualistic preferences for concepts of power and self-help (Mills, 1994: 
152). 
ill) RECONCILING THE ARGUMENTS 
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Up till today the common interest of mankind in its own sheer survival has not forced 
national interests to recede or take a back seat. Citizens continue to identify with the interests 
of their immediate environment rather than with such a distant and abstract concept as 
humanity. The idealist falls victim to world-embracing ideals which, because of their 
vagueness and generality, can provide no national guidance for resolving concrete political 
problems (Russell, 1990: 100). It seems unlikely that policy makers would sacrifice the less 
inclusive national community to the wider, but chimeric, world community. More often than 
not, "the blood of natiori'al security considerations may run thicker than the water of 
ideological sympathy"(Wolfers, 1967: 128). Even such international doctrines as 
Communism (with its stress on one communist world) have not succeeded in solving some 
dramatic clashes between the interests of individual communist states, such as Yugoslavia, 
and the interests of the communist whole. It becomes apparent that the planes of utopia and 
reality never coincide - the ideal cannot be institutionalized nor the institution idealized (Carr, 
1981: 100). 
In addition, goals appearing to be of a self-transcending kind have revealed themselves as the 
most ambitious goals of self-extension. For instance, attacking human rights abuses in other 
countries is an attractive option for those who wish to legitimise their policies, distract from 
domestic difficulties, and/or create a negotiating advantage with an adversary. This ethically 
compromised nature of statecraft (the invoking of abstract moral principles to justify concrete 
national interests) was noted by the ancient Greek Philosopher, Plato, who referred to the 
'noble lie': "our rulers will probably have to make considerable use oflies and deceit for the 
good oftheir subjects" (cited in Jackson and Sorensen, 1999: 78). In this sense, moral 
principles are not realized in the real world of conflicting interests by moral fervour alone, but 
instead by a pragmatic calculation of the means to an end or by a rational anticipation of the 
actual consequences of a given action (Russell, 1990: 241). This alludes to the reality that 
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human rights and other noble aspirations do not actually determine policy, but are really 
sugarcoats designed to make policies acceptable. When the 'national interest' is replaced 
with 'humanitarian interest' or the interests of the 'international community,' it is cynically 
concluded that foreign policy becomes a vehicle for social work and the kind of flag-waving 
seen under Ronald Reagan (Vincent, 1994: 34). Incorporating human rights into foreign 
policy is thus aimed more at creating a certain impression to satisfy the needs of donors and 
investors. 
Although moral interests such as human rights may be no less real than material interests, 
they are often less tangible and policy tends to be made in response to relatively tangible 
national objectives. The perennial issue between the realist and utopian schools of thought 
over the nature of politics might well be formulated in terms of concrete interests versus 
abstract principles. Rhetorical acceptance is both insufficient and glosses over the real 
objections to human rights violations, particularly when it conflicts with free market ideals. 
A central problem is the gap between usage and observance. Although the language of 
human rights has entered the common parlance of interstate diplomacy, this does not mean 
that the rights are observed. Indeed, codification of rights does not translate into adhesion to 
rights. While it is easy to articulate a commitment, finding a way to effectuate it is a whole 
other ball-game. Such commitments have normative strength but procedural weakness, that 
is, they are composed of widely accepted, substantive norms but very limited implementation. 
South Africa requires carefully defined foreign policy goals and priorities, rather than the 
ambitious wish-list articulated at present. With its long list of guiding principles, based more 
on rhetoric than matters of real substance, there is a danger of South Africa developing a self-
image as a benign foreign policy godmother. Already, the much vaunted 'new diplomacy' 
has been accused of being cut from the same cloth as President Bush's somewhat fraudulent 
'new world order' of the late 1980's (Evans, 1991: 4). In South Africa, desire and intent 
often overshadow the real results. Whether consistent and substantial official South African 
support for universal human rights exists, is debatable. There is broad consensus that 
although the rhetoric is there, actual practise shows that the government is influenced quite 
substantially by old friendships on the one hand, and pragmatism (often brought on by 
economic imperatives) on the other. Nevertheless, the duality of our foreign policy is not 
really at war with reality - in international politics, our morality and power should not be 
antithetical. 
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Principles, such as a commitment to human rights, should not necessarily be seen as 
idealistic; rather, the identification of such principles should be seen as an essential part of 
defining the national interest. Morgenthau concurs that "the choice is not between moral 
principles and national interest devoid of moral dignity, but between one set of principles 
divorced from political reality and another set of principles derived from political reality" 
(Russell, 1990: 140). It shows that morality and realism are not necessarily incompatible. As 
such, to treat them as if they are can harm not only a state's human rights policy but its 
broader foreign policy as well. As Carr pointed out: 
Any sound political thought must be based on elements of both utopia (i.e. values) 
and reality (i.e. power). Where utopianism has become a hollow and intolerable 
sham, which serves merely as a disguise for the interests of the privileged, the realist 
performs an indispensable service in unmasking it. But pure realism can offer 
nothing but a naked struggle for power which makes any kind of international society 
impossible (Carr, 1962: 93). 
It becomes apparent that both realists and idealists possess important but limited truths about 
the world. In chapters five and six, South African foreign policy will be analysed with 
reference to case studies to see which prevails. For now, we will examine South African 
foreign policy to disaggregate the practical manifestations of competing influences as 
represented by realism and idealism. Specifically, we wi11look at how human rights concerns 
and the imperative~ of national economic prosperity are shaped by both the external 
environment and domestic factors, which interact to impose choice dilemmas on South 
African policy makers. 
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Chapter Three 
South African foreign policy and the 'new' world order: promotion of human 
rights or preservation,of national economic interests? 
Foreign policies are not made in a vacuum. They are made in relation to other bodies 
similarly acting in the global arena. One may deduce that the external situation can determine 
the course of policy or, at least, severely limit the options open to the policy maker - thereby 
restricting or enhancing his/her freedom to manoeuvre. "The eternal experience of Ministers 
is to find that their choices are predetermined, above all, by the intractable facts of 
international life. Effective freedom in foreign affairs .. .is the capacity to choose between 
relatively few options" (Wall ace, 1971: 17). We need to take cognizance not only of the 
external environment that shaped South Africa's foreign policy but also her strategic options 
since her first democratic elections in 1994 if we are to truly appreciate the decisions that 
were made. Two of the most powerful political images of recent times are projected by the 
fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) and the release of Nelson Mandela (1990). The end of the Cold 
War and the triumph of human rights constituted the broad framework within which South 
Africa's foreign policy was moulded. 
A. EXTERNAL INFLUENCES 
I) POST APARTHEID SOCIETY AND THE RISE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL AGENDA 
The importance of human rights and its ascendancy as a legitimate concern of the 
international community is connected with some very important social changes inherent in 
the history of our age. Urbanisation and the spread of literacy has produced the phenomenon 
of mass political awakening. It is simply a fact of life today that people can no longer be 
treated as passive objects; this fact itself dictates the increased salience of human rights. As 
Louis Henkin put it, "human rights is the idea of our time, the only political moral idea that 
has received universal acceptance" (cited in Vincent, 1994: 31). In this century, the 
systematic genocidal slaughter of Jews in Nazi Germany, the disappearance of Chileans under 
the Pinochet government, and the racism of apartheid South Africa have all stimulated 
demands for human rights observance and the idea now characterizes relations between states 
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and their responses to international events. Concurrent with this internationalisation of 
morality was the emergence of anti-colonialist sentiment and a desire for self -determination. 
The new stress on human rights encouraged a broad (albeit uneven) world movement towards 
democratic rule and reflected a change in international mores. It becomes apparent that the 
general concept of human rights represents an attempt to move beyond thin globalism and 
recognize a set of worldwide, overarching values to be respected in their own rights. As 
Thabo Mbeki pointed out, "the language of human rights is indeed becoming a universal 
language and it is increasingly becoming the standard against which the world judges 
countries and countries judge the world." (Statement on International Human Rights Day, 10 
December 1998) 
International responsibility for the universal protection of human rights has gained wider 
acceptance over the past half century. This is reflected in the growth of the UN human rights 
machinery, international institutions of justice, and the number of durable conventions in 
which the universality of human rights has been enshrined. The UN Charter which came into 
being in 1945, is the first international mechanism to incorporate human rights as a concept 
and to make the promotion and protection of these rights one of the purposes of the individual 
and collective obligations of states (Langley, 1999: xi). In 1948, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights was adopted by the UN (Langley, 1999: xi). It was later refined into two 1966 
covenants, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Langley, 1999: xiv), and reflects a 
duality which has become important in safeguarding human rights world-wide. These two 
covenants and the declaration house the core of human rights norms and have come to 
constitute what is now known as the International Bill of Human Rights. Additional rights, 
pertaining to special categories of persons such as children, the disabled, minorities, and 
refugees have also been expanded in recent years. They are further supplemented by 
conventions ranging from the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination against women and the 1997 Declaration on the Human Genome and Human 
Rights (Langley, 1999: xv). There have also been numerous debates such as the 1993 World 
Conference on Human Rights (Langley, 1999: xvii). The commitment to human rights is 
also reflected at a regional level. The 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, 1969 
Cb AI 
19 
American Convention on Human Rights, the 1975 Helsinki Accords for Eastern Europe, the 
1981 African Charter on Human and People's Rights (Langley, 1999: xv) and the Declaration 
of the Basic Rights of the ASEAN Peoples and Governments adopted in 1983 (Langley, 
1999: 149) attest to this. All that notwithstanding, much of the surge of interest in human 
rights in the last two decades can be traced to the catalysing effect of President Jimmy 
Carter's efforts during his Presidency (1977-1981) to make international human rights an 
objective of US foreign policy (Art and Jervis, 1992: 514). 
It is interesting to recall that when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was put before 
the UN General Assembly in1948, there were no votes against it but there were eight 
abstentions (including South Africa) (Goldstone, 1997: 416). It is obvious that the projection 
of human rights as an element in foreign policy requires support. Supporting human rights 
may mean anything from armed intervention to a statement in Parliament. The effort will not 
always succeed, but it is unlikely to be wholly ignored. For instance, autocrats are usually 
defensive when they are accused of failing to respect human rights, as is exemplified by 
China's outraged protestations every time she stands accused. Pressures for human rights 
discomfits oppressors, encourages their victims and, in the long run, makes the world a safer 
and more peaceful place. In addition, the seemingly inescapable ideological appeal of human 
rights in the post-Cold War era is an important element in the rise of international human 
rights regimes. Indeed, human rights have become the genuine historical inevitability of our 
times (Brzezinski, 1996: 2, electronic version). 
The universal claims of all mankind for a better life place heavy burdens on all countries, 
especially South Africa. South Africa's past has compelled her to attempt to fill a leadership ' 
vacuum in the quest towards preserving or enhancing human rights world-wide. Given the 
past importance of international support for the ANC (both through formal international 
institutions and through the transnational anti-apartheid movement), Nelson Mandela was 
expected to replace the isolationism of the past in favour of a bold new internationalism. 
Indeed, Aziz Pahad, South Africa's deputy foreign minister, ,describes the increasing pressure 
on South Africa to take a stand on human rights abuses all over the world as 
'understandable:' "because with the maj ority of South Africans having come through the 
experience of apartheid and the battle for democracy in the most confrontational way, the 
issue of human rights is fundamental to people's thinking"(Pahad, 1996: 9). 
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The anti-apartheid campaign was the most important human-rights crusade of the post-World 
War IT era. In part the product of this far flung, global effort aimed at extending and 
intensifying the respect for human rights, the new South Africa has its own moral and 
political obligation to participate in the ongoing drive to secure and extend the respect for 
individual and collective forms of human rights elsewhere. The ANC government, 
conscious of this debt, feels the need to contribute morally, politically and, in part, financially 
to the improvement of the international human rights situation. It is submitted that our new 
democracy offers an anvil to cast a foreign policy supportive of human rights (Seymour, 
1996: 10). Born of its dramatic tr~nsformation from pariah to paragon, South Africa is in a 
unique position to lead, not just by example, but by deed. Consequently, South Africa has 
resolved to not being indifferent to the rights of others: the country will reciprocate the global 
anti-apartheid movement and show solidarity to people who suffer under regimes which do 
not respect international human rights (Mandela, 1993: 2, electronic version). In essence, 
South Africa wants human rights to be the light that guides her foreign affairs (Mandela, 
1993: 2, electronic version). South African foreign policy makers admit that "some of the 
steps we will take are symbolic but in our efforts to canonise human rights in our 
international relations we regard them as far more than this (Dietrichsen, 1994: 223). 
Dr Alan Sharpe, former chief director of social affairs at the DF A, points out that South 
Africa knows that by pursuing these rights internationally, it does not stand to benefit in terms 
of its own national economic interests (Sharpe, 1996: 26). However, rights not defended are 
rights easily lost and rights lost can lead to instability and violence as the situation in 
Zimbabwe (lack of socio-economic, specifically land, rights for indigenous Zimbabweans) 
attests to. South Africa is concrete proof of the positive results that accrue from a belief in 
human rights: human rights and the rule of law provided the basis of South Africa's 
successful transition, as illustrated by its carefully negotiated constitution. . 
II) POST-COLD WAR CHALLENGES AND THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL 
ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA 
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Under pressure of the human rights provisions of the wide-ranging Helsinki accords of 1975, 
communist governments were forced to tolerate dissident movements (Russet and Starr, 
1992: 5). The end of the Cold War (1989) marked a number oflandmark events such as: the 
free elections which ousted communist governments in most of Eastern Europe; Gorbachev's 
limited political and economic reforms in the Soviet Union; and the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
Those events thoroughly changed the contours of international politics. The basic values of 
the West -- democratic government and free market economies -- seem to have triumphed; 
the Cold War which had dominated international relations since the end of World War IT 
ended on terms largely dictated by the capitalist west. History was again, to use Arnold 
Toynbee's phrase, on the move (Vale and Taylor, 1999: 1, electronic version). 
'High' and 'low' politics are now beginning to change places or, at least, to merge. The net 
result has meant that ideological or theoretical straitjackets moulded in post-Westphalian 
Europe and refined globally by the Cold War are no longer serviceable in the quest for 
security, order, development, prosperity, or justice (Evans, 1991: 3). Traditional notions of 
national security based on military preparedness are now giving way to broader conceptions 
of 'defence' where security is seen largely in terms of interdependence and non-adversarial 
community concerns. The altered environment has allowed economists, traders and the 
business sector to carve a new niche for themselves in the 'new' world order. The end of the 
old East/West confrontation has brought increased competition for investment funds and 
markets as well as opportunities to forge new economic partnerships and blocs . . For example, 
as the Cold War geopolitical framework eroded, China's domestic reforms (primarily, the 
economic liberalization) made possible the breakdown ofthe partition of Asia for the first 
time. It is clear that "all nations will have to boldly recast their nets if they are to reap any 
benefit from international affairs in the post-Cold War era" (Mandela, 1993: 1, electronic 
version). 
Growing interdependence and transnationalism has meant that economic and industrial 
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diplomacy have become features of international relations since the 1990's. Terms like 
globalization have come to describe processes in which international economic relations have 
come to impact to an unprecedented degree on domestic policy options. The laws of the 
international economy have become like gravity - one cannot defy them (Edigheji, 2000: 34). 
Global 'economic enmeshing' has proceeded at such a pace that what goes on outside the 
territorial boundaries of the state often conditions what can be achieved within them (Evans, 
1999: 2, electronic version). 
During the Cold War, the paradigm that dominated interpretations of international affairs was 
one of Cold War rivalry. This has been replaced in the post-Cold War era by a culture of 
interdependency where "changes or events in any single part of a system will produce some 
reaction from or have some significant consequence to other actors of the system whether 
they like it or not" (Russet and Starr, 1992: 439). Increased interdependence and increased 
awareness of interdependence means that governmental decision makers have to think about 
and take into account the effects their internal policies have on foreign relations with other 
states. The complexity of the world has come to include the interconnectedness of our 
problems as well as our collective well-being. The traditional notion of individual states 
seeking their own special or national interests is now counterproductive in a shrinking world 
which leads toward more cooperation among states as they are brought together. The 1994 
UN Development Report posits that "the end of the Cold War presents an opportunity for a 
radical rethink of international relations, based on new priorities and principles"(Seymour, 
1996: 3). An alternate approach to international relations is supported by academics such as 
Ken Booth who urge scholars to pay less attention to interstate relations and instead 
concentrate on what he calls 'global ethics' (Booth, 1995). 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that a nation which dares indulge in altruistic pursuits and 
constantly allows its interests to be sacrificed cannot survive in a competitive global system. 
For example, the communist states often made sacrifices to promote party doctrine and the 
idea of world communism. The fate of such communist states serve as a warning to South 
Africa not to ignore national interests in the pursuit of universal values such as human rights. 
However (as discussed earlier), greater interdependence erodes arguments about national 
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interest. Increasingly, decision-makers act on behalf of clusters of nations as well as their 
own. They identify their own interests as inextricably tied to the welfare of the region and for 
continent. Interdependence limits the nation-state's ability to conduct business without 
reference to any other country's interests. It becomes apparent that there is no place for 
"patriotic snobbery" in the 'new' world order (Duchacek and Thompson, 1960: 23). In an 
interdependent world economy, South Africa's prosperity could be hostage to decisions made 
in countries whose idea of justice, human rights, etc. may not necessarily be compatible with 
ours. One country can only neglect human rights abuses in another country at its own peril. 
Nations are not islands sufficient unto themselves; suffering in one country may cause pain in 
others. As Nelson Mandela noted, "the great challenge of our age is to answer the question; 
given the interdependency of the world, what is it that we can and must do to ensure that 
democracy, peace and prosperity prevail everywhere ... " (Sharpe, 1996: 26). 
However, the development of norms concerning international protection of human rights and 
humanitarian law is seen as an infringement of sovereignty in that they challenge the principle 
of non-intervention, especially the right of states to govern their citizens free from outside 
interference (Jacks on and Sorensen, 1999: 263). In 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali claimed that 
"the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty ... has passed. Its theory was never matched by 
reality" (cited in Jackson and Sorensen, 1999: 263). This can be problematic because 
although increasing global interdependence has opened up new opportunities, these have been 
accompanied by new threats as inequalities in international relations become more 
accentuated. For example, while economically powerful countries such as China enjoy a pre-
eminent position in the new world order despite an atrocious human rights record, the 
countries singled out for bashing are often those like Myanmar which offer few economic 
opportunities and have little power to hit back. 
The post-Cold War era has witnessed the creation of a community of mutual dependence, but 
not one of mutual trust and respect. In the foreseeable future, members of the present 
international community will continue to be sovereign though interdependent; the hope is that 
as they come to better appreciate the implications of their interdependence they can be 
weaned away from their traditional bellicosity in favour of peaceful collaboration towards a 
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world of peace, progress and justice (Goodwin, 1974: 46). Without a higher integration, 
advancing technology tends to sharpen economic rivalries - they change the ocean barriers of 
yesterday into the battlegrounds of today (Niebuhr, 1960: 124). 
South Africa re-entered the world community and began transforming its foreign policy 
precisely at a time when countries were grappling with the demands of the post-Cold War 
world. The fundamental challenge that faced South Africa was described as the need to 
"adapt its economy and social system to the norms of a given external reality whilst striving 
to become a 'winning nation' in a fiercely competitive world" (Davies, 1995: 1). A truly 
ideologically-driven foreign policy after 1994 was probably prevented by the necessity of 
adaptation to the new post-Cold War environment. Minister Alfred Nzo, in September 1995, 
described the global environment and its impact on South Africa in the following terms: 
.. .Ideological conflict has to a large extent been replaced by economic 
competition .. .It is our primary task to secure and promote the sovereign integrity of 
the South African state, as well as the security and welfare of its citizens. These are 
considerations which ultimately determine everything we do in the conduct of our 
foreign relations. (South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document, 1996: 8). 
Africa's global position has been acutely affected by the ending of the Cold War - the 
continent and the destiny of its people are no longer subj ect to the vagaries of superpower 
rivalry and conflict. This has grave implications for the further marginalisation of the 
continent. According to Pierre Biarnes, "Africa has lost invaluable leverage with the end of 
the Cold War. Now for an indeterminate period, Africa will have no global strategic 
importance ... " (cited in Suttner, 1997: 350). It is astutely pointed out that the emerging 
world order will not fully serve South Africa's interests and the country needs to contest the 
rules as they emerge (Shubin, 1995: 7). In this regard, the strategic importance of China's 
position in the UN Security Council should be duly noted. Although it is up to South Africa 
to work towards redefining and reshaping the world order in a manner that is equitable and 
just, the release of Southern Africa from Cold War politics combined with a world-wide 
weariness with Africa and the reordering of western political and economic priorities leads 
one to suspect that South Africa's foreign policy reorientation is basically reactive rather than 
pro-active (Evans, 1991: 4). 
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B. DOMESTIC IMPINGEMENTS 
The last section alluded to the external environment which shaped South Africa's foreign policy. 
This chapter attempts to rationalize the duality that plagues South Africa's foreign policy in terms 
of internal constraints. 
I) NATIONAL INTERESTS 
The concept of national interest has a dubious place in history. AdolfHitler justified his policies 
in the name of Germany's national interest. Joseph Stalin destroyed and/or displaced Russian 
farmers in the name ofthe Soviet Union's interests. Lyndon B. Johnson was convinced that the 
interests of America and the Western World were at stake in the historic Indo-China 
confrontation. 1)'1 South Africa, apartheid was defended by the Nationalist Party government on 
the grounds that it served the interests of South Africa's mining and manufacturing industries by 
providing cheap migrant labour. One wonderS what role national interest plays in democratic 
'-
South Africa's foreign policy. Does South Africa's new stress on human rights mean that narrow 
national interests are takipg a back-seat or are human rights simply a means to realize national 
int«rests based on considerations of prestige, reputation and domestic reaction? 
'Objectivists' assume national interest can be objectively determined. These analysts posit that 
the best interest of a nation is a matter of objective reality and by describing this reality one is 
able to use the concept of the national interest as a basis for evaluating the appropriateness ofthe 
policies which a nation pursues (Rosenau, 1974: 187). Hans Morgenthau contended that "interest 
is the perennial standard by which political action must be judged and directed" (Morgenthau, 
1954: 9). Although he emphasized that the objectives of a foreign policy must be defined in 
terms of national interest, he recognized that "the kind of interest determining political action in 
a particular period ofhistory depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign 
policy is formulated" (Rosenau, 1974: 188). In contrast, 'subjectivists' argue that national 
interest is a pluralistic set of SUbjective preferences that change whenever the requirements and 
aspirations of the nation's members change (Rosenau, 1974: 188). They allude to the fact that 
goals and interests are value-laden and that people differ on wh~t constitutes the most appropriate 
goals for a nation. In the case of South Africa, the concept of national interest was abused in 
/' , 
politicaJ usage. For much of the past 45 years, South Africa's foreign policy has served and been 
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defined by narrow sectional interests of its white citizens. 
Logically, countries must not only concern themselves with the safety and well-being of the 
international order of which they are a part but also, they must operate within a specific internal 
order. It is generally expected that any government's most fundamental duty is to provide for the 
basic needs of its citizens including economic prosperity, welfare, and the provision of individual 
security. Moreover, the state is the guardian of its citizen's interests - what is collectively termed 
the national interest - in the international sphere. Hans Morgenthau pointed out that "a foreign 
policy guided by moral abstractions, without consideration of the national interest, is bound to 
fail" (Morgenthau, 1951: 33-34). The language of foreign policy is closely linked to the language 
of nationhood and national purpose: statesmen have commonly talked about their country's 
'place in the world' or have boasted or worried about their nation's 'international standing.' For 
example, the strength of America's moral reputation (a positive image ofthe nation in the minds 
of other nations) is an important addition to its capacity to realize its aims on the international 
scene. 
Although South Africa's foreign policy in the post apartheid era comprises of a new commitment 
to human rights, it remains predicated on the pursuit of identifiable national interests, specifically 
national economic interests. These national interests may be said to be underpinned by the 
general values enshrined in the Constitution which encompass the security of the state and its 
citizens, the promotion of social and economic well-being, and the encouragement of global 
peace, regional stability and development (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 
108 of 1996). 
The concept of national interest has served to legitimise a government's external objectives and 
to cut short domestic debate about these objectives. To say that an action is 'in the national 
interest' is to label those who oppose it as disloyal. This led Hans Morgenthau, Walter Lippman, 
and others concerned with the failure of western democracies to avoid the second world war to , 
surmise that this failure was due to the "policy-makers' neglect oftheir national interest in favour 
of mistaken conceptions of international morality" (Wallace, 1971: 31). They attributed the 
failure to the "incapacity of democratic governments to cope with reality ... to defend their vital 
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interests"and argued that the remedy lay in a proper awareness of the "nature oftheir country's 
national interest, and in its steady pursuit" (Wallace, 1971: 31). 
If any goal stands out as the one most frequently acknowledged and extolled for nations to 
pursue, it is the goal of economic development. The reason lies in the intermediate status of this 
goal: economic development can be given primacy in national and international policy precisely 
because it is a necessary means to many other goals. As Friedrich Engels pointed out, "economic 
relations ... are those whose action is ultimately decisive, forming a red thread which runs through 
all the other relations and enables us to understand them .... " (Quoted in Duchacek and 
Thompson, 1960: 269). It should be noted that the traditional militarylsecurityissue-areas which 
have held centre stage for over forty years in world politics are now increasingly giving way to 
a new awareness of wealth, welfare and environmental concerns which "render earlier 
orthodoxies about how to promote the national interest at best irrelevant and at worst downright 
dangerous" (Evans, 1991: 3). In today's world, survival as a nation translates into economic 
survival; the formula for the protection of national interest has come to be practically 
synonymous with the formula for national economic preservation. The transition from a security 
to an economic interpretation of national interest is understandable considering the 
interdependent, competitive global capitalist system. 
Since economic issues now stand at the very centre of international relations, it is not surprising 
that trade and foreign investment issues should be a cornerstone of South Africa's foreign policy. 
Unless South Africa can attract substantial volumes of foreign investment it appears destined to 
face economic collapse. This is especially so since South Africa will have to cope with the high 
capital consumption demand necessary to ensure development. The future of any new South 
African foreign policy must rest crucially on its foreign fmancial and trade policies. In this 
regard, the importance of China (despite her human rights record) cannot be disputed. A Likert 
Scale (appendix 2) designed to measure ordinal attitudes of staff in the Department of Foreign 
Affairs (DF A) and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), indicated a basic, not total, 
commitment to human rights among those interviewed. However, there was unanimous 
agreement affirming the statement 'preserving national economic interests should be at the heart 
28 
of foreign policy. ,I 
Nevertheless, concessions for the sake of peace may lead to a more modest interpretation of 
national interest. Moreover, idealistic broad goals such as human rights may be used as a means 
toward some specific national-interest goal. For example, a nation which sets out to increase 
its prestige through the advocacy of a visionary foreign policy based on the protection and 
promotion of human rights may increase its bargaining power in the process. In turn, this can 
open up greater opportunities such as more investments. The 'harmony of interests' doctrine 
assumes that rational calculation of interest, within an overall framework of market economics, 
ensures that 'the national interest' and 'the international interest' become one and the same 
(Evans, 1991: 10). However, it is maintained that states have no international obligations that 
come before their national interests - international law and international organisations are merely 
instrumental considerations in determining the national interest of states (J ackson and Sorensen, 
1999: 158). The re-assertion by a DTI official of the familiar adage that "nations have no 
permanent friends, only permanent interests" seems apt (Interview F, appendix 1). 
Morgenthau attempted to harmonize the successful defence of national interest with the 
promotion of desirable values in foreign policy. The American statesman believed that the 
principles of morality and the necessities of power artr not mutually exclusive categories by 
which to defme the scope and objectives of the national interest. Russell interprets 
Morgenthau's conception of a responsible foreign policy as beginning "with the practical 
necessities of survival and the maintenance of a balance of power and, at the same time, 
I Aside from a few basic observations it was difficult to draw conclusions from the results of 
the Likert scale. Although respondents were requested to respond in their official capacity they 
seemed unable to disentangle personal (often idealistic) beliefs from professional concerns. This 
resulted in contradictory responses to questions. For example, whilst all the respondents agreed 
that South African economic interests in Angola should not take precedence over human rights 
considerations, they, nevertheless, affirmed that preserving national economic interests should 
be at the heart of foreign policy. The ambiguity in responses does not bode well for the 
implementation of foreign policy. One could suggest that this is one of the reasons for South 
Africa's ambivalent position on a number of crucial foreign policy issues (such as China's human 
rights record). 
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accommodate the transcendent values ofthe American people, who insist upon universal moral 
principles" (Russell, 1990: 3). South Africa's pragmatism produces a penchant for examining 
issues separately and it is suggested that perceiving human rights as a part of national interest 
should be the first step in resolving the contradictions inherent in her foreign policy. It is 
postulated that in every case the interpretation of what constitutes a vital national interest and 
how much value should be attached to it is a moral question (Wolfers, 1967: 60). According to 
Russell, Morgenthau would concur that the'national interest itself commands a certain moral 
dignity because it functions as the protector of minimal world values in a world lacking order and 
moral consensus beyond the bounds of the national state (Russell, 1990: 100). 
Danger lies in the illusion that by labelling something we clarify it. Some contend that it is more 
appropriate to talk of interests rather than of a single national interest, to look for a number of 
separate and often conflicting objectives rather than for a single overriding operational goal 
(Wallce, 1971: 13). Furthermore, matters discussed under national interest could very well be 
discussed under ideology. In addition, we can draw a distinction between narrow and enlightened 
national interest. As President Nixon observed, "we are not involved in the world because we 
have commitments, we have commitments because we are involved. Our interests must shape 
our commitments, rather than the other way around" (Jackson and Sorensen, 1999: 78) 
II) IDEOLOGY, BELIEF SYSTEMS AND LEADERSHIP ATTITUDES 
Values, emotions, perceptions, and personality are a few of the many non-rational aspects of 
foreign policy making. They are a reflection of psychological and subj ective aspects of policy 
making which highlight the importance of perceptions of, and attitudes toward, leaders. Anyone 
doubting the impact that single individuals can have on the workings of foreign policy, relations 
among states, or even the structure ofthe international system need only examine the career of 
Mikhail Gorbachev during his tenure as President of the Soviet Union. Decision makers have 
been conceptualized as "individuals who arrive at their decisions by confronting their values with 
their image of the environment"(Wallace, 1971: 30). An individual's idiosyncrasies are made 
up of values, personality, political style, intellect and past experience which work together to 
create the individual's set of images about the world - the individual's belief system (Russet and 
Starr, 1992: 269). People evaluate and perceive the world according to what they are concerned 
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with at the moment. Often, objectives which originated entirely as a means of attaining some 
distant end become beliefs, take on a life of their own, and become valued for their own sake 
or because they become intertwined with other goals such as prestige and self-respect (Legg and 
Morrison, 1974: 196). The quest for human rights is an example of such a phenomenon. 
Political leaders, especially in a democracy, live a precarious life in which the demands made 
upon them always exceed their capacity to satisfy them. They are expected to solve many, often 
contradictory, social problems - to preserve and promote national interests (for example, 
economic growth) whilst simultaneously pursuing higher aspirations through a commitment to 
human rights or a quest for peace and good governance. Statesmen have a national responsibility 
to their own nation and its citizens; they have an international responsibility to observe and 
follow international law and respect the rights of other states; and they have a humanitarian 
responsibility to defend human rights around the world (Jackson and Sorensen, 1999: 55). 
However, it is important to note that political responsibility flows in a vastly different vein than 
ordinary private morality (Jackson and Sorensen, 1999: 79). A political leader does not have the 
same freedom to do the right thing that a private citizen has; a political leader has far heavier 
responsibilities. Since the citizens of a country depend on the leader for their security and 
welfare, the cultivation and protection of the domestic base from which s(he) derives political 
authority often takes priority over international and humanitarian considerations. Machiavelli' s 
contemplation is enlightening: 
A prince ... cannot observe all those things for which men are considered good, for in 
order to maintain the state he is often obliged to act against his promise, against charity, 
against humanity, and against religion. And therefore, it is necessary that he have a mind 
ready to turn itself according to the way the winds of fortune and the changeability of 
[political] affairs require ... as long as it is possible, he should not stray from the good, 
but he should know how to enter into evil when necessity commands. (Jackson and 
Sorensen, 1999: 70) 
Nonetheless, Nelson Mandela has been described as an "international symbol for the 
achievement of peace and justice" and epitomises South Africa' s status as an international cause 
celebre (Bischoff, 1995: 6). Confidence in the unique influence wielded by South Africa due to 
Mandela's 'moral stature' permeated much of the new thinking on South African foreign policy 
and gave the country a new found authority in the area of human rights. The celebratory rhetoric, 
centred around the 'miracle' of Man del a's 'long walk to freedom,' is conveyed by the popular 
31 
domestic concept of 'Madiba Magic' (Vale and Taylor, 1999: 2, electronic version). According 
to this narrative, the country is personified in one man and all things are possible if and when he 
becomes invoived. With the inauguration of a democratic government, South African foreign 
policy became a highly personalized affair with Nelson Mandela' s international superstar status 
overshadowing everything else. Ironically, it meant that South Africa's post apartheid foreign 
policy would be more constrained than before: Mandela had to assume much wider 
responsibilities at precisely the moment when he faced the most urgent demands for domestic 
social and political initiatives. While having a leader ofthe calibre of Nelson Mandela had its 
advantages, Aziz Pahad pointed out that it put greater pressure on the country to deliver: "This 
is something no other country has to wrestle with; our president symbolises everything everyone 
in the world aspires to, and while we are happy to be called a political miracle, those who create 
miracles are supposed to deliver on everything - internally and externally." (Pahad, 1996: 10) 
It is suggested that while South Africa will remain a symbol of the third world struggle for 
liberation, human rights, and global economic justice, South Africa's current president, Thabo 
Mbeki, will be in a better position to determine policies by rational assessment than his 
distinguished predecessor. Although Mbeki also has a long and honourable place in the struggle 
against apartheid he, unlike Mandela, does not carry the restrictive burden of being one of the 
heroes ofthe 20th century world (Evans, 1999: 4, electronic version). Seen as a man rather than 
a saint, Mbeki's policy choices are much more amenable to rational cost-benefit assessments and 
remain comparatively unencumbered by fixed normative principles or by grand populist 
expectations (Evans, 1999: 4, electronic version). Even his vision of an African Renaissance has 
a practical economic dimension to it when he theorised that "Africa's renewal" would enable the 
continent to "achieve sustainable economic development" (Mbeki, 1998: 298). 
The Zimbabwe crisis illustrated Mbeki' s pursuance of his goals through a combination of quiet 
diplomacy (private talks with Mugabe and constructive engagement instead of a hard-line 
position) and assertive multilateralism (campaigns on behalf of Zimbabwe to the IMF). This 
contrasts with the adventurous or romantic postures of confrontation and defiance adopted by 
Mandela during the early years of his presidency. While Mbeki has signalled a greater 
willingness than Mr Mandela to embrace the repertoire of realpolitik, the approach has the 
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advantage of being sensitive to African development and needs (Evans, 1999: 5, electronic 
version). 
Almost a decade down the road from apartheid, Mbeki is aware that the inescapable priority for 
South Africa is domestic reconstruction and political stability. Accordingly, South Africa's 
international profile over the next few years must generate tangible material pay-offs. The 
priority of the second post-apartheid administration is to foster a dynamic economy that will 
provide jobs, welfare, security, and sustainable development for the South African people. A 
decade after Nelson Mandela walked out of prison and South Africa's political revolution started, 
his successor Thabo Mbeki is launching another revolution -- an economic one. Labelled 
'Mbekonomics,' it is geared towards facilitating South Africa's transition from a low-growth, 
export commodity-driven, protected economy to a fast-growing, diversified, competitive one 
(Africa Confidential, 18 February 2000: 5). It becomes apparent that the leitmotifofMbeki's 
diplomacy is interest defined in terms of economic development, expressed with the custodial 
framework provided by the primacy of domestic politics and a high profile commitment to the 
Republic's African heritage and destiny (Evans, 1999: 6, electronic version). 
The different approaches adopted by Mandela and Mbeki to foreign policy may be attributed to 
a shift in ideology. Ideology is a coherent and organised set of beliefs (Russet and Staff, 1992: 
207). It is argued that ideology is based on false consciousness and manufactured, deliberately 
or otherwise, to lend political legitimacy and moral energy to a government's foreign policies 
(Russet and Staff, 1992: 210). This alludes to the use of ideology as a political act which seeks 
to present a certain policy to voters in terms of moral and political folklore. Moreover, it refers 
to the ideological wrappings of national objectives: wherever interests are vigorously pursued, 
an ideology tends to be also developed to give meaning, re-enforcement and justification to these 
interests. South Africa's foreign policy has largely been determined by her chequered history. 
In the past, South Africa's foreign policy was strongly predicated on its internal ideology of 
apartheid. As the need for change became all too apparent, the foreign policy objectives of the 
dominant party in power, the African National Congress, became the driving force in giving 
shape to the foreign policy agenda of the post apartheid state. These objectives were initially 
idealistic, a reflection of the liberation rhetoric. Mbeki' s tenure in power has been accompanied 
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by an extremely pragmatic assessment ofthe government's objectives which acknowledges that 
the "honeymoon" is over and that material benefits for citizens take precedence over any other 
external aspirations. 
Nevertheless, there is an element oftactical expediency in the focus on human rights. The issue 
provided a powerful ideological weapon in the struggle against the Soviet Union and its 
communist doctrine (Brzezinski, 1996: 2, electronic version). However, this led to human rights 
claims being met with the politically potent charge of misguided moralism. For example, when 
Reagan assumed the US presidency in 1981 , human rights became the stick with which to 
belabour the 'evil empire' ofthe Soviet Union and its allies (Clapham, 1994: 43). Clearly, the 
pursuit of human rights as a goal of foreign policy must reflect a measure of neutrality, that is, 
it must be pursued without additional ideological baggage. Moreover, the application of human 
rights in foreign policy must remain consistent - human rights abuses cannot be condoned on the 
basis of friendly relations or on the basis ofthe ideological affiliation ofthe perpetrator. To do 
so would be to destroy the idea that human rights have universal application. South African 
foreign policy makers could do well to heed this. America's credibility in human rights has 




Rationalizing South African Foreign Policy 
From 1994, the post-revolutionary fervour associated with liberation policies resulted in 
normative and theoretical confusion about proper foreign policy goals and objectives. Faced with 
the escalating costs of retaining policies drawn from the liberation period, the ANC has shifted 
between liberation rhetoric and conciliatory pragmatism. However, the organisation has 
generally followed a foreign policy which puts domestic concerns ahead of internationalist 
obligations, inverting the formula which had guided other liberation movements after taking 
power. For instance, in neighbouring Mozambique, Front for the Liberation of Mozambique 
(Frelimo's) decision to introduce sanctions against Rhodesia contributed significantly to the 
economic crippling of Mozambique (Alden, 1993: 77). 
In spelling out South Africa's foreign policy principles, former South African Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Alfred Nzo, averred that the underlying principles which would serve as "guidelines in 






A commitment to the promotion of human rights and democracy 
A commitment to justice and international law in the conduct of relations 
between nations 
A commitment to international peace and to internationally agreed upon 
mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts 
A commitment to the interests of Africa in world affairs (includes the promotion 
and attainment of the African Renaissance) 
A commitment to economic development through regional and international 
cooperation in an interdependent world." (South African Foreign Policy 
Discussion Document, 1996: 19) 
It becomes apparent that a post apartheid South Africa has distinctive political principles and 
values that define its national identity and which give a distinctive role to the country in the 
world. In this regard, the use of the term' guidelines' is interesting since the very same principles 
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are described in other speeches and government documents as "the pillars upon which our foreign 
policy will rest" (Mandela, 1993: 2, electronic version). This flexible application of principles 
acknowledges the fact that foreign policy has to occur against the background of the real world 
and the limitations it imposes on us. 
In addition, the management of South Africa's foreign policy inheritance needed to be reconciled 
with a rather complex and unique domestic political dispensation. The primary point of 
departure for the government was to develop a better life for all by creating wealth, providing 
security, and promoting the welfare of its citizens. The DF A defined this as its over-arching goal 
during a conference in 1999 (The Citizen, 15 January 1999: 8). It reinforces the adage that 
administrations might change but fundamental interests do not. South Africa's foreign policy 
objectives remain essentially an outward projection of its domestic imperatives. 
South Africa cannot have a transformation driven by the values enshrined in the new constitution 
on the one hand, and a different stance when it comes to foreign policy and relations with the rest 
of the world on the other. Against this background, the government has taken steps to bring its 
foreign policy in line with its moral standing in the international community. South Africa has 
committed -its foreign policy to help in ensuring that the world is "more secure, peaceful, 
democratic, humane, equitable, and people-centred" (Sharpe, 1996: 26). In this respect, human 
rights has become a cornerstone of South Africa's foreign policy. 
1) HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY 
Like the US government in the early years of the Carter Presidency, the South African 
Government has put a premium on the promotion and protection of human rights as a cornerstone 
of its foreign policy. Even prior to his assumption ofthe Office ofthe President, Nelson Mandela 
stated that "human rights will be the light that guides our foreign affairs"(Mandela, 1993: 2, 
electronic version). It was later elucidated that "South Africa would not shrink from its 
responsibility to help resolve conflict and advocate human rights on the continent" (Seymour, 
1996: 19) and that "we shall speak out against oppression in all its forms and manifestations of 
abuse of human rights, injustice, inequality and discrimination" (Dlamini-Zuma, 1999: 205). 
South Africa's commitment to human rights was further entrenched by the Durban Declaration 
tabled by South Africa at the 1998 summit of the Movement of Non-Aligned States: 
... As we mark the 50th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
nothing should be used as a convenient mask to hide genocide, gross violations of 
human rights and crimes against humanity ... we must seek a world order of compassion 
for the weak, of human rights and development for all ... (Compendium of South African 
statements during the XII NAM Summit, p7) 
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But what does this mean practically? How do we get human rights enforced and implemented 
in the international environment? Although it was regarded as being of equal importance to both 
wealth creation and security, the difficulty in following a foreign policy dictated by human rights 
considerations became increasingly apparent to the government. The criticism evoked by South 
Africa's relationships with countries such as China, Iraq, and Indonesia (all have dubious human 
rights records) attests to this. The DFA's Rusty Evans points out that "this is the price we will 
have to pay in many situations in the future, because, as in everyday life, it is never easy for a 
nation to be morally upright"(Evans,R. 1996: 12). 
Morality is a contested principle in foreign relations and the promotion and protection of human 
rights and democracy is easy to state as an aspiration but difficult to implement. Foreign policy 
should be formulated against the background of what South Africa can realistically hope to 
achieve. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad and former Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Alfred Nzo, often stated in parliamentary and other speeches that South Africa's 
initiatives in Africa (in particular) and internationally (in general) should take place within the 
realistic parameters of her capacity to implement decisions (South African Foreign Policy 
Discussion Document, 1996: 25). Pahad, intimated that "the problem we face in this regard is 
the issue of possibilities and limitations on South Africa in the real world ... there has to be 
interaction between theory and practise" (Mills, 1997: 4). In this regard, it is also important to 
distinguish between promoting human rights and ensuring respect for such rights. Promotion is 
a broad commitment, manifested for example in South Africa's efforts to facilitate a democratic 
transition in Nigeria. In the second case, the sale of (or refusal to sell) arms can be guided by 
whether or not there is respect for human rights in the state wishing to purchase arms. 
In many respects, South Africa has limited leverage vis-a-vis other states. However, she appears 
to have considerable moral power, manifested not only in the enduring stature ofN e1son Mandela 
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but also in the overall international respect for the country's democratic transition. Emerging 
from a struggle that embraced the extensive moral power of solidarity groups throughout the 
world, South Africa is now in a position to exert considerable moral influence on others - but 
how decisive or effective moral power is in the world today is difficult to gauge. In addition, a 
fundamental question pertaining to human rights policy centres around the degree to which a 
nation is obligated to impose its values on others. South African policy makers need to analyse 
their true intentions or risk being subjected to the same criticism as their American counterparts 
who declared that "the purpose of our foreign policy is not to bring enlightenment or happiness 
to the rest of the world but to take care of the life, liberty, and happiness of the American 
people"(Russell' 1990: 209). 
Moreover, South African foreign policy should not just be structured to reflect specific values; 
it should be substantively directed to the promotion of those values in the external environment. 
South African foreign policy makers boast ofthe country's involvement in a number of ventures 
to promote human rights on a multi-lateral level. Among other things, they cite her activities in 
the UN Commission on Human Rights (South Africa chaired its 54th session in 1998) and her 
participation in a number of human rights related conventions and protocols such as the UN 
agreement on Human Rights Defenders (www.gov.za/yearbook/foreignrelations.htm). However, 
one has to realize that South Africa does not have a monopoly on morality and there are a number 
of other countries which have also been involved in similar attempts to promote and protect 
human rights. South Africa's sudden pro-activeness in the human rights field needs to be 
understood in terms of a natural process of foreign policy evolution after a long period of 
apartheid isolation. Indeed, there is still much to be done. For instance, although she signed the 
Geneva Conventions in 1952, there is still no South African legislation incorporating its 
provisions (Interview B, appendix 1). 
Furthermore, human rights concerns should be extended to South Africa's bilateral relations. 
Initially, it was averred that South Africa would not be selective nor afraid to raise human rights 
violations with countries, even when it might negatively affect her own interests. South Africa's 
own experience shows how damaging policy can be when issues of principle are sacrificed to 
economic and political expediency. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfred Nzo, 
affirmed that: 
South Africa is not oblivious to human rights abuses in individual countries. South 
Africa's concerns have been raised in her interaction with leaders of a number of 
countries, and we have urged them to uphold universally acceptable human rights 
principles. The message has been reinforced by the way in which human rights concerns 
influence government decisions on arms sales, the support which South Africa gives to 
a country's candidacy for posts in international organisations, and the many other ways 
in which we conduct our foreign relations (Suttner, 1997: 307). 
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However, this noble position appears to contradict reality and other messages from the DF A. For 
example, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad, contends that when it comes to the 
violation of human rights, South Africa cannot stand as judge and jury. He asserts that 
South Africa recognizes and interacts with countries irrespective of what their ideologies 
are; if we don't, we may as well put a shield around ourselves and live in total isolation. 
We have our own understanding of human rights, democracy and good governance, and 
will continue to use our influence to help achieve that in other countries (Pahad, 1996: 
9) 
Although South African foreign policy has a human rights dimension, it is flexibly applied, and 
the degree or level of flexibility appears to depend on who knows who as well as economic and 
other strategic factors. It leads us to appreciate the fact that the DF A is not the only department 
which makes foreign policy and shows that no country in the world can have a human rights 
driven foreign policy without some trade-offs. The past few years have demonstrated that in this 
sensitive area of human rights, wrong tactics and strategies can undermine the goals that we set 
for ourselves. South African foreign policy makers claim that "while being more committed than 
ever to the promotion of human rights, we are much the wiser in how to attain our objectives" 
(Selebi, 1999: 215). 
II) NATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEREST IN SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
In addition to its commitment to human rights, South Africa has also taken cognizance of the 
policies adopted by a number of newly industrialising countries such as Malaysia where foreign 
policy and external diplomacy are primarily economically orientated. Economic development 
issues are generally at the forefront ofthe foreign policies of many newer states and South Africa 
is no exception. The essence of South Africa's foreign policy is to promote and protect the 
interests and values of its citizens: "we prize our commitment to peace and to human rights in 
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the far corners of the globe but recognise that the security of our people also lies close to our 
foreign policy" ( www.gov.zalyearbooklforeignrelations.htm) . 
On the eve of the announcement ofthe power-sharing arrangement between the ANC and NP in 
early 1993, a senior member of the ANC's International Department summed up the dramatic 
transformation of the organisation's approach to foreign policy: "our future relations with the 
international community will have to be based on economic and trade considerations rather than 
ideological considerations" (Alden, 1993: 77). Aziz Pahad affirmed that South Africa's 
international priorities would be dictated by the need to ensure the success of the government's 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (Alden, 1993: 55). The global economic 
environment is a fiercely competitive and complex arena in which South Africa is a relatively 
small economic power. South Africa needs substantial economic growth to satisfy vital needs, 
to meet at least some expectations of the dispossessed majority. The RDP is the rationale used 
to justify concentrating foreign policy on the management of economic relations with specific 
countries (Bischoff, 1995: 8). In this way, the primacy of domestic politics is likely to mitigate 
against heroic foreign policy postures that do not directly contribute to the amelioration of the 
social and economic injustices inherited from the apartheid government. It may not be the most 
ideal solution but higher aspirations will of necessity be subordinated to satisfy the minimum 
basic demands of the majority of South Africans. In a world where national interests run 
rampant, there is a danger that the enormity of South Africa's domestic reconstruction may cloud 
a larger vision. 
It becomes evident that the DF A's new diplomacy is informed by the understanding that the flag 
would follow trade. Consequently, South Africa's foreign policy now targets specific regions 
and areas that are of geo-political (there are other issues at stake such as South Africa's quest for 
a permanent seat on the UN Security Council) and commercial importance. In practice, this 
translates into "being very nice to the rich and powerful, nice to the potentially rich and powerful, 
and kind to old friends who are neither" (Debates of the National Assembly, p.931). In the effort 
to attract substantial foreign investment, 'economic diplomacy' is fast becoming the major focus 
of the DF A's activities. However, this 'neo-mercantilist' path could have costs in terms of 
broader external economic relations since there is an increasing linkage between the type of deal 
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a democratic South Africa will be able to cut with the major trading blocs and the way the 
country is seen to be conducting itself in the Southern African region (Davies et aI, 1993: 61). 
Unless the country is seen to be playing a positive role in the region, it will probably not be able 
to secure the best deal possible with the major global economic powers. Already, the handling 
of the Zimbabwe crisis has had a negative effect. 
Ill) AMBIGUITY IN SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
In 1977, US President Jimmy Carter came out strongly in favour ofhuman rights and completely 
banned aid and exports to countries accused of violating them (usually in Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America). Nevertheless, in 1978 he strengthened official ties between the US and the communist 
government of China (Chomsky, 1997: 2). It is suggested that like the US, South Africa has a 
twin-track foreign policy. On the one hand, it pursues preferred policies such as the opening of 
relations with Beijing in preference to Taiwan and the close ties with Indonesia, Cuba, and Libya. 
On the other hand, and perhaps mindful of the success of its own recent transition, the 
government outwardly displays concerns over human rights and democratisation elsewhere. 
I 
The ANC spent decades appealing to the world's conscience in order to end the morally 
repugnant system of apartheid. Now that it is in power, this same organisation appears 
incapable of making moral judgements about who they should deal with and who they should 
not. The active promotion of South African arms exports to an unstable Middle East, the 
predominant use of narrow economic considerations to judge whether or not to break off 
diplomatic relations with Taiwan in favour of new relations with the PRC, and relations with 
Indonesia and Sudan which remained unaccompanied by any definitive public position on the 
abuse of human rights, are cases in point. In fact, the relationship with Indonesia led to the 
subordination of one of the ANC's important political principles -- solidarity with other 
liberation movements and oppressed peoples (Thomas, 1994: 184). Alluding to its close ties 
with so-called pariah states, the ANC government maintains that "these countries had contributed 
enormously to the freedom of other peoples, including that of South Africans and through our 
relations with these countries, the government has proved that its international relations are based 
not on political expediency but on principles" (Muller, 1999: 7, electronic version). Indeed, 
sticking with ones's friends through thick and thin demonstrates a commitment to principles. In 
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this sense, South Africa's foreign policy is not incongruent with the broad values that she 
promotes. 
Emerging from a political situation that was characterized by armed and violent conflict, the new 
South Africa inherited an advanced defence industry which many defence analysts argue can 
contribute considerably towards poverty alleviation in the country (Khanyi1e, 2000: 25). 
Nevertheless, it is argued that a state that wishes to pursue a human rights agenda internationally 
will have to be 'pure' at home (Mills, 1997: 15). This requires a careful handling of issues such 
as arms sales, especially considering that South Africa is one of the most significant weapons 
exporters from the South. 
Since 1990, when Pretoria announced that it had dismantled one partially assembled and six 
complete nuclear weapons, South Africa has possessed an unusual status in the international 
community as one ofthe few voluntarily disarmed nuclear weapons states (Mills, 2000: 8). This 
accorded the country a special voice on arms control and disarmament matters. South Africa's 
strong stance did not mean that she ceased to function as an arms trader. It merely implied that 
she would act as a responsible arms trader, and this began with the formation of the National 
Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) and a fixed set of criteria to regulate the arms 
trade. These criteria included a respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the internal 
or regional situation within the recipient country, and the degree to which the sales were 
supportive of South Africa's national and foreign interests (White Paper on Defence, 1996: 
sec.3.5.l- sec.3.5.6). 
However, these criteria are often applied flexibly, nullifying its real purpose. For example, one 
of the criteria for arms sales is that countries buying arms must have democratic and non-
repressive regimes (White Paper on Defence, 1996 : sec.3.5). Despite this, South Africa has 
concluded an arms deal with China (The Natal Witness, 6 June 2000). Employees at the DFA 
coldly point out that taking a high principled position not to export arms only means that 
someone else will (Interview B, appendix 1). Such evidence of South African arms being 
supplied in situations where human rights violations occur or might occur raises fundamental 
questions about the coherence and responsibility of Pretoria's foreign policy. There appears to 
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be a lack of moral homogeneity as South Africa promotes human rights whilst engaging 
simultaneously in controversial arms deals that may undermine those very rights. 
Following Iraq's stand-off with the UN over weapons inspections, the South African government 
announced that it was entering into talks around formal diplomatic relations with the country 
(Sunday Tribune, 5 April 1998: 1). Although this was contrary to UN sanctions and Iraq's 
leader, Saddam Hussein, was notorious for human rights violations, it was argued that the 
Middle East was South Africa's fastest growing trade partner. South Africa's decision to market 
tank-firing systems to Syria also raised a storm of protests from those concerned about 
Damascus's human rights record and the already volatile Middle East peace process (Mills and 
Boulden, 1997: 1, electronic version). Moreover, in the 1990's South Africa was further 
criticised for supplying arms to both the Tutsi regime in Rwanda as well as to Hutu rebels; the 
tragedy in Rwanda is now a matter of public record (Gold stone, 1997: 446, 448). Indeed, 
speculation about arms transfers to countries with controversial human rights records or 
unresolved conflicts (including Sri Lanka, Uganda, Indonesia and Sudan) evoked a lot of debate 
in Parliament in 1997 (Khanyile, 2000: 29). 
It becomes evident that there are clear elements of inconsistency, even hypocrisy in South 
Africa's attempts to foster the cause of human rights around the world. The preceding section 
highlighted the promotion and preservation of the national economic interest as a central tenet 
of South Africa's foreign policy. This is an inevitable consequence ofthe fact that human rights 
are only one of many foreign policy concerns. In the real world, democratic countries trade 
enthusiastically with countries like China and Indonesia. They may wince at massacres in 
Beij ing or East Timor, but they will not, in President John Kennedy' s words, "pay any price, bear 
any burden" to promote liberty (The Economist, 4 December 1997: 2, electronic version). As 
Nelson Mandela eloquently put it, " ... these values whose honouring in practise should be the 
purpose of all politics, normally swirl around as unwanted debris in the wake of the turbulent 
march ofa macho world of economic growth and intensely fought power games" (Compendium 
of South African statements during the xn NAM Summit, 1998: 25). 
It becomes evident that there are two patterns of thought that shape the dynamics of South 
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African foreign policy. The first is based on a crusading foreign policy motivated by universal 
ideological appeals. The second pattern has a pragmatic thread running through it which 
emphasizes the nation's interests in terms of its power vis-a-vis other nations. Choosing one 
above the other may very well unravel the fabric of South African foreign policy. Therefore, it 
is essential that the country reconcile this duality instead of eliminating it. 
In this regard, we need to work out what it means in practise to place human rights, justice, and 
democracy at the forefront of South Africa's foreign policy. This certainly does not mean that 
South Africa should refuse to conduct diplomatic and trade relations with countries with 
unsatisfactory human rights or democracy records. But it should also not mean that when we 
engage with the governments of such countries, we ignore, marginalise or subordinate these 
principles and only concentrate on trade and diplomacy. Aziz Pahad, addressing the issue of 
South Africa's foreign policy priorities, explained that 
although an important consideration, the human rights situation in a particular country 
is not the only element taken into account when deciding whether to establish diplomatic 
relations. South Africa's overall national interest (in terms of commercial factors, 
historical considerations, political ties etc.), the geo-political importance of a country 
and its influence in world affairs have to be assessed. South Africa may decide to 
maintain existing or establish diplomatic relations with a country, despite a poor human 
rights record, because our presence in that country will enable us to promote human 
rights and democracy (AIden, 1998: 91). 
A crucial point is that by trading or concluding diplomatic relations with a particular country, 
South Africa is not necessarily expressing approval of the domestic policies of that country's 
government. A high ranking official from the DF A argued that "we have to interact with all 
types of states and try to nudge them into international norms" (Interview C, appendix I). It 
would be paradoxical to go to war with another country over its human rights record - the loss 
of lives and other hardships that accompany any war fly in the face of such a position. 
Nevertheless, 'constructive engagement' may not always yield optimal results. South Africa's 
own democratic transition was, in part, due to the tough economic sanctions imposed by the 
international community. On the other hand, it is unlikely that a similar position would work for 
an economically powerful country such as China. In China, the economy is so strong and large 
that it does not need South Africa; in fact the opposite is true. A DF A official noted that "if 
South Africa begins to function under autarky and isolate countries like China, she would simply 
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end up isolating herself' (Interview B, appendix 1). It becomes apparent that reconciling the 
promotion and protection of human rights with the preservation of national economic interests 
has to occur on a case by case basis and any criteria governing such decisions would have to be 
flexibly applied. True, it does not make for a consistent foreign policy but whether this is 
desirable, given the circumstances, is debatable. 
It is interesting to note that the Director General of Pretoria' s DF A speaks of a 'new diplomacy' 
not a 'new foreign policy' (Evans, 1991: 4). The difference is important. Diplomacy is not a 
synonym for foreign policy. Whereas the latter can be described as the substance, aims, and 
attitudes of a state's relations with others, diplomacy is one of the instruments employed to put 
these into effect (Evans, 1991: 4). In this regard, the 'new diplomacy' envisaged refers only to 
the enabling vehicle and does not encompass a change in the composition ofthe passengers, the 
purpose of the journey, or significantly, the eventual destination (Evans, 1991: 4). One may 
conclude that the vehicle change reflects a change in style rather than substance, in manner rather 
than matter. It is important not to confuse the two if we are to correctly assess the intentions of 
the South African government. 
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Chapter Five 
Case Study - People's Republic of China 
The debate over whether South Africa should recognise the Republic of China (ROC; Taiwan) 
or the People's Republic of China (PRC; Beijing) evolved around a cluster of emotive issues that 
cut to the core of foreign policy making in the new democracy. It centred around the degree to 
which human rights and economic and development considerations should determine a nation's 
foreign policy. For the newly empowered ANC, entering government with an explicit mandate 
to incorporate human rights into South African foreign policy, these concerns posed difficult 
choices. A state which, in its own departmental profile (1996) on foreign affairs, declared that 
it has "a duty to show solidarity to people who suffer under regimes which do not respect 
international human rights" is naturally vulnerable to appeals made on those terms (Alden, 1998: 
84). 
Identifying a human rights violation determines a country's options (in terms of international law 
in particular, which generally protects state sovereignty) but not what a country has the capacity 
to do. In addition, geographical distance further reduces a country's options. A DFA employee 
noted that "Zimbabwe is our immediate neighbour, our biggest African trade partner and the 
second largest economy in SADC. You can't act against it in the same way as you would with 
a country miles away. The British can do that, we can't. .. "(Interview A, appendix 1). However 
this argument does not apply to China; it cannot be used to explain South Africa's position 
toward the country and merely highlights the inconsistency in South African policy. In addition, 
if the US which is supposedly the champion of human rights and democracy in the world still 
trades with China actively, what influence is a relatively small country that is miles away going 
to have? A high ranking official at the DF A observed that "you move an elephant with great 
difficulty" (Interview C, appendix 1). It is, therefore, crucial that one draws a distinction between 
identifying the problem and the capacity to act or react. 
Nelson Mandela's refusal to bring the new South Africa into step with international practise by 
cutting diplomatic ties with Taiwan was understandable, considering that the country had picked 
up at least R20 million of its 1994 election bill (Cornish, 1997: 250). Nevertheless, on 1 January 
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1998, South Africa established full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China 
( www.gov.zaJyearbook/foreignrelations.htm ). The handling of the shift from Taiwan to the PRC 
left much to be desired. In November 1996, President Mandela assured the Taiwanese vice-
Premier Hsu Liteh that it would be "immoral" for South Africa to break ties with Taiwan , , 
(Burrows, 1997: 103). Only two months later he did just that (the rationalization behind the 
decision will be explained later). In this regard, South Africa compromised both its commitment 
to human rights and its sense of fair-play (consider Mandela's reassurance that ties would not be 
broken and the use of Taiwan to foot part of the election bill). Despite expectations to the 
contrary, it showed that South Africa's foreign policy would remain embedded in pragmatic 
thought. 
Concerns over the continuing status of South African business interests, not to mention its 
diplomatic presence, were pivotal in reversing the government's position on official recognition 
of the PRC. If South Africa did not recognise the PRC, it would have "run the risk of 
endangering its prosperous ties with Hong Kong" which Britain ceded to the PRC in 1997 
(Geldenhuys, 1995: 11). Hong Kong has one of the highest levels of foreign reserves in the 
world and with R3.6 billion worth of South African trade passing through the port, there were 
growing fears that South Africa's business and diplomatic interests would be jeopardised once 
the PRC resumed sovereignty (Alden, 1998: 90). By the end of 1998, South Africa's trade with 
the PRC, including Hong Kong, had risen to R8, 8 billion (www.gov.za/ 
yearbook/economy.htm).2 This situation added to the growing costs of retaining the status quo 
with Taiwan (there was no real reason to offend the PRC since South Africa and Taiwan 
continued with trade, scientific, cultural and other relations, and Taiwanese investors continue 
to enjoy full protection under South African law, and all other benefits extended to foreign 
investors). The decision taken in December 1996 to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan 
to the PRC by the end of 1997, allowed South African business to take advantage of the exciting 
trade opportunities that the PRC had to offer, with its potential market of 1.2 billion people and 
economic growth rates averaging about 10% annually but as high as an unprecedented 40% in 
some ofthe coastal provinces (Burrows, 1997: 102). China has emerged as a major player in the . 
2Trade with Taiwan tumbled by 9,2% in 1998 (www.gov.zaJyearbook/economy.htm) 
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world economy with trade totalling $319 billion, of which $182 billion was in exports, making 
it the tenth largest trading country (Mazibuko, 1996: 15). 
Such statistics hint at a potentially rewarding relationship with the PRC. Already, Beijing has 
announced a major investment deal for South Africa involving a mini city consisting of hundreds 
of factories, warehouses, shopping malls, a hotel and a casino, which is aimed at creating around 
500,000 jobs and which could be worth more than R54, 5 billion in the next two years (The 
Citizen, 27 August 1996). Chinese investments in South Africa are worth more than R500 
million while South African companies have invested more than R4 billion in China (Southscan, 
5 May 2000: 70). China has also become South Africa's fifth largest trading partner. In 1999, 
South Africa's exports to China were valued at $208 million while its imports from China were 
worth $686 million (Southscan, 5 May 2000: 70). In addition, Merchant Shipping Agreement 
was signed which aims to lay the foundation for the predicted huge cargo movement between 
South Africa and East Africa and China, Hong Kong, and Macau (Southscan, 5 May 2000: 70). 
Although the switch of diplomatic allegiance forced the Taiwanese government to withdraw 
certain economic assistance and SA Airways landing rights in Taipei, the retention of South 
Africa's landing rights in Hong Kong after the territory's return to the PRC was considered more 
important and lucrative. Moreover, the PRC has given SA Airways overflight rights over 
mainland China that will shorten the airline's route to Japan (Cornish, 1997: 252). In addition, 
the South African armaments industry intimated that the opportunities offered by the Chinese 
market exceeded those of Taiwan (Alden, 1998: 85). 
Any analysis of South Africa's relationship with China should also take into account her 
ambitions to receive support for an African permanent seat on a restructured Security Council. 
As a permanent member with veto power, China would be able to block such an initiative. 
Mandela's decision to abandon diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in favour of China actually 
came at a time when he was playing a role in helping Africa secure a second term at the helm of 
the UN.3 
3It is a reference to the initiatives taken to promote the selection of an African as the UN 
Secretary General to succeed Boutros-Boutros Ghali (Cornish, 1997: 251) 
&3 Jll: I 
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It is pointed out that "China and South Africa both excuse many of their shortcomings by citing 
the complexity of the problems they face. Both have made enormous, indeed historic strides 
since the 1990s. Both will benefit from their new relationship" (Cornish, 1997: 256). The 
DF A's Deputy Director-General for Asia and the Middle East Region, Thuthukile Mazibuko, 
cites the China issue as one of her greatest challenges: "the eyes of the world are on China and 
most countries, including South Africa, are trying to anticipate what China's role will be in the 
next century. We have to consider how we will be placed when China becomes a major 
economic power" (Mazibuko, 1996: 15). The decision to regularize relations with the world's 
most populous country and the world's largest emerging market can only be to South Africa's 
long term benefit. Indeed, it seems sensible not to deny the de jure existence of a great power 
with a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, the world's largest population, advanced 
nuclear capability, and which boasts one ofthe fastest growing economies in the world. Political, 
strategic and economic considerations make it imperative that South Africa should follow the 
lead ofthe vast majority of nations in extending official recognition to Beijing. 
All this is not to suggest that the PRC is an exemplary international citizen. In fact, there are 
sound moral reasons for countries to keep the PRC at arm's length, treating it as a delinquent 
state violating universally accepted norms of good conduct. Actually the PRC is something of 
an anachronism in the post-Cold War era; it is one ofthe few remaining communist dictatorships 
in a world that has largely turned its back on this form of government. 
China's human rights record also remains problematic to many other countries. With its record 
of imprisoning political opponents, use of prison labour in the manufacture of goods for export 
and the widespread use of the death penalty, China is a rich source of material for human rights 
activists. Not only do vivid memories of the 1989 massacre at Tiananmen Square persist but 
also many of the principal official actors still hold power in Beijing (Geldenhuys, 1995: 5). In 
China, 1999 saw the most serious and wide-ranging crackdown on peaceful dissent for a decade 
(Amnesty International Report, 2000). Thousands of people were sentenced to death and many 
were executed. In October of 1999, China signed the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (Amnesty International Report, 1999). Despite this, torture and ill-treatment of 
thousands of prisoners of conscience (especially nuns and monks) remain endemic. Many have 
been sentenced after unfair trials, others are held without charge or trial. The government made 
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no move to review these cases even though such offences had been abolished in law in 1997 
(Amnesty International Report, 1999). 
Moreover, whilst the bureaucratic interpretation of China's 'one child' popUlation policy 
continued to stir controversy, new regulations on registration of social groups and publishing 
were introduced in October and December of 1999, increasing restrictions on freedom of 
expression and association (Amnesty International Report, 1999). The parallels with South 
Africa under apartheid rule are uncanny. The failure to acknowledge Beijing's violation of 
human rights stands in sharp contrast to the ANC's own foreign policy blueprint: 
... the ANC will canonise human rights in our international relations ..... South 
Africa should and must play a central role in a worldwide human rights campaign 
..... South Africa under ANC rule will be neither selective or afraid to raise human 
rights violations with countries where our own and other interests might be 
negatively affected ... (ANC Foreign Policy Perspective, 1994: 5-8). 
On the contrary, South Africa and China have exchanged most favoured nation status (The Star, 
15 February 1996). In addition, a South African DF A official maintains that should a resolution 
on human rights in China be tabled at the Human Rights Commission of the UN, South Africa 
will abstain from voting for reasons pertaining to her economic interests (Interview B, appendix 
1). 
The violation of human rights is extended to Tibet where China's communist rulers stand 
accused of committing genocide against the indigenous people. The exiled Dalai Lama serves 
as a constant reminder of the plight of the captive Tibetan nation. In addition, the PRC and 
Taiwan came close to hostilities in March 1996 during the Taiwanese presidential elections. In 
an attempt to intimidate Taiwanese voters, the PRC conducted aggressive missile tests and 
military manoeuvres in waters close to Taiwan, including a simulated attack on a Taiwan-like 
island (Burrows, 1997: 90). The communist rulers have openly warned that an independence 
declaration by Taiwan would justify the use of force to bring the island back into the fold. This 
readiness to resort to armed force flies in the face ofthe ANC's own commitment to the peaceful 
settlement of disputes expounded in its 1994 foreign policy document (ANC Foreign Policy 
perspective, 1994). 
The PRC's belligerent attitude towards Taiwan, its attempt to control large numbers of small 
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islands in the South China Sea, and its various disputes over land boundaries place it in potential 
conflict with Russia, India, North Korea, Tajikistan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, 
Japan, Brunei and the United States (Burrows, 1997: 91). Considering that in the past century 
alone China has fought no fewer than seven wars, any acquisition of weapons on her part is 
understandably viewed with anxiety by the region. South Africa's contribution to this (via the 
sale of arms to China), is a direct violation of her commitment to achieve solutions in a peaceful 
and humane manner. This turnaround in South African policy amounts to a case of money over 
morality. 
Issues of human rights and trade have been de-linked in China's case. China's geo-political and 
economic importance often insulates her against any criticism and pressure which only serves 
to reinforce the maintenance of intolerable situations ofhuman rights abuses within the country. 
It does appear as if "human rights has become the sacrificial lamb offered up to trade" 
(Brzezinski, 1996: 6, electronic version). Nevertheless, South African foreign policy makers are 
adamant that "although it is imperative that we strengthen trade links and attract investment, 
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human rights violations do concern us" (Mazibuko, 1996: 16). It is certainly true that if we 
sacrifice human rights on the altar of trade with China, fighting for it in places like Myanmar 
become more difficult. The whole shambles will merely confirm the prejudices of sceptics who 
think the very notion of linking human rights and foreign policy is tenuous. At the UN 
Commission on Human Rights session, South Africa distanced itself from both African and non-
aligned voting blocs by voting on a European motion to debate the human rights situation in 
China (Cornish, 1997: 255). However, in June of 2000, Defence Minister Mosiuoa Lekota 
announced that South Africa will sell weapons to China (The Natal Witness, 6 June 2000). 
Lekota did not specify when and for what purposes China needs the weapons. Rather, he 
emphasized that China's human rights record would not harm the deal. All this is despite the 
promise by the former Deputy Minister of Defence, Ronnie Kasrils, that "we would not sell 
weapons to countries that violate their people's human rights, are involved in civil war, or 
threaten the sovereignty of their neighbours (Weekend Argus, 15/16 October 1994). China 
practically violates all these principles. 
On the other hand, some foreign policy makers (especially those at the Department of Trade and 
Industry) contend that China is reforming even though western-style democratization is not yet 
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in evidence (Interviews D, E and F; appendix 1). Attempts to liberalise are slow and the Chinese 
government institutes change very reluctantly, but this is understandable considering events in 
the former Soviet Union. In addition, it is important to remember that China has a different 
history from the West's decentralised democratic systems. Her highly centralised empires were 
considered the most efficient under the circumstances (How else do you control such a large 
population?). It is astutely pointed out that the management of power in a country of a billion 
people could not follow the same pattern as in a traditional nation-state and the challenge of sheer 
size becomes even more pressing with transnational economic forces pulling apart the old fabric 
of Chinese society (Interview F, appendix 1). China considers stability in a country of its size 
as paramount, placing this above individual rights. Opening up the political process to mass 
democratic participation is viewed as a recipe for chaos. China abuses human rights but what 
is the alternative? Chinese history shows that without centralised control the country will 
descend into anarchy. Imagine the implications for the rest of the world. When China was in 
this position in the 1930's, with every foreign power meddling in the effort to carve out a sphere 
of influence, the result was the Pacific War which claimed millions of lives (Interview F, 
appendix 1). The official view ofthe leadership is that " ... during the Tiananmen disturbances, 
had the Chinese government not taken the resolute measures, then we could not have enjoyed the 
stability that we are enjoying today" (Cornish, 1997: 254). Presumably, this is the same 
justification used for current human rights violations. 
Defenders of the Chinese reform strategy emphasize that meeting people's basic needs is much 
more important to human rights in China than introducing western-style democracy. It is often 
argued that development without democracy is possible, but democracy without development has 
a very short life-span. China is the reigning world champion of economic upliftment, having 
pulled some 300 million people from absolute poverty in the last 20 years (Cornish, 1997: 254). 
A recent World Bank report labelled China's high life expectancy, universal primary education 
and other social-welfare achievements as "enviable" (Cornish, 1997: 254). 
It is difficult to say how far human rights should extend and what priorities should be pursued. 
Maurice Cranston's solution (to which most western countries adhere) was a league table of 
human rights, putting civil rights first and economic rights or aspirations in the second division 
(Vincent, 1994: 29). China has approached it the other way around. She has given priority to 
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a class ofhuman rights (socio-economic rights) that the west has chosen to de-emphasize. Thus, 
criticizing China's human rights policy takes on an ethnocentric slant. 
Nevertheless, the issue of diplomatic recognition remains problematic and whether South Africa 
has made the most suitable decision, is often contested. Taiwan is not simply a subordinate 
region ofthe PRC: Chinese communists, who seized power on the mainland in 1949, have never 
been able to extend their jurisdiction to the adjacent island of Taiwan which is a fully-fledged 
liberal democracy (Geldenhuys, 1995: 6). Moreover, Taiwan has already invested some R1.4 
billion in South Africa, creating over 4000 jobs in over 280 factories (Geldenhuys, 1995: 14). 
When compared to other industrialised countries, the PRC hardly features as either an investor 
or aid donor to South Africa. It should be added that the economies of South Africa and the PRC 
are in many respects competitive rather than complementary, a feature that may restrict the 
growth of trade. Already, the Trade and Industry Department has had to negotiate a deal to limit 
spiralling imports from mainland China which are seriously harming local industries (The Star, 
29 January 1996). Indeed, the PRC may not turn out to be the land of boundless economic 
opportunities for foreign traders and investors: ranged against its impressive economic growth 
rate and its immense potential market are an inflation rate of over 25 % and endemic government 
inefficiency and corruption that already make it hard for foreigners to do business there 
(Geldenhuys, 1995: 6). 
The China issue presented South Africa with a unique opportunity to provide innovative and 
moral leadership on a truly global scale. Unfortunately these moral imperatives were not entirely 
compatible with economic and political interests and were effortlessly abandoned. However, 
South Africa now has to be wary that even the pragmatism, expressed in economic terms, might 
not hold all the anticipated benefits. What morality requires ofthe South African government, 
if it intends being true to its own high ideals for humanity, is that recognition of and ties with the 
PRC must carry with it the obligation to take Beijing to task over its abuse ofhurnan rights. 
Chapter Six 
Case Study - Zimbabwe 
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The Zimbabwean crisis is the latest conundrum to accost South Africa's human rights-based 
foreign policy. It brought into question South Africa's integrity and commitment to human 
rights, fair play, and justice. The difficulty in implementing a foreign policy with a human rights 
dimension was aggravated in Zimbabwe by the problem of upholding two different sets of rights 
(political and socio-economic) for two different groups of people (indigenous Zimbabweans and 
white farmers). 
Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwean African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) 
justified and supported the invasion and occupation of white farms by arguing that they were 
acquired by imperial conquest, not the rule of law. The previous white Rhodesian regime had 
systematically stripped the African population of the country's most productive land without 
paying any compensation. Although the Zimbabwean government has been criticized for 'land-
grabbing,' these accusations need to be assessed within the broader context ofthe past (that is, 
who grabbed the land first). At the UN's Millennium Summit, Mugabe emphasized that most 
of Africa was still burdened by the unfinished business ofthe twentieth century: ''we cannot tax 
our own people, as poor as they already are, to pay farmers who are the grandsons ofthe robbers" 
(Sunday Times, 10 September 2000). It has been argued that the responsibility for compensating 
the farmers lies with Britain, not just as the former colonial power but because Margaret Thatcher 
agreed to provide the funds as a condition ofMr Mugabe signing the Lancaster House agreement 
which finalised Zimbabwe's independence twenty years ago (Africa Confidential, 28 April 2000: 
1). Zimbabwe's parliament has now amended the constitution to allow the government to seize 
farmland without compensation, for redistribution. This occurred despite the fact that Mugabe 
lost the referendum regarding such constitutional changes. White farmers have taken it as a sign 
of unconstitutional behaviour and disrespect for the rule of law, and consequently bemoan the 
loss of their political rights. 
On the other hand, it is pointed out that past legislation such as the Land Tenure Act and the Land 
Apportionment Act were racially motivated laws enacted to secure the best land for white settlers 
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(Electronic Mail and Guardian, 8 December 1997). Moreover, during the Lancaster House talks, 
the British government did its utmost to protect the privileged position of its descendants by 
insisting on constitutional provisions that would prevent the black majority from redressing the 
imbalances created by nearly a century of white domination and subjugation (Electronic Mail and 
Guardian, 8 December 1997). In this regard, it is not surprising that whenever the post-
independence government attempts to create laws that seek to reverse the imbalances, they are 
regarded as unconstitutional. The same people who have denied black Zimbabweans many of 
their rights are now appealing to the courts for the protection oftheir constitutional rights. Is it 
fair to talk about political and human rights when nothing is being done to address the issue of 
the rights of indigenous Zimbabweans to the resources of their country? 
The delicate nature of the issues characterising the Zimbabwean crisis challenged the very 
foundations of South Africa's foreign policy. The adoption of a hard stance during the 
Zimbabwean crisis would have suggested the protection of white Zimbabwean interests above 
those ofthe indigenous people. Considering its own turbulent past, it would have been extremely 
difficult and costly for the South African government to sustain sanctions against an African 
government campaigning against white land-holdings. The issue has already stirred frustration 
over the slow pace of the land redistribution program in South Africa where a recent poll in 
African townships revealed 54% support for Zimbabwe's land seizures (Africa Confidential, 7 
July 2000: 4). 
As with China, a coherent policy towards the country is compounded by a number of UN 
declarations on non-intervention and principles of international law prohibiting states from 
"interfering in civil strife in another state"(Suttner, 1997: 16). Whether this legalistic 
interpretation is adequate, is mooted. One cannot dispute that there are unspoken rules of non-
interference and respect for sovereignty, but it should be acknowledged that within this same 
body of rules, there are also those that enunciate the sanctity and inviolability of life. One could 
argue that internal matters become matters of legitimate external concern once the level of 
conflict and instability creates an effect that impacts on other states. In an interdependent world, 
one country's domestic instability may become more of a problem for its neighbours. The 
situation in Zimbabwe attests to this. Already, 8 billion rands in annual cross border trade has 
been disrupted (The Economist, 2000: issue 8166, electronic version). 
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With globalisation diminishing the significance of national boundaries and the world economy 
no longer looking at national markets but rather at regional markets, Southern Africa will either 
have to join the club or get left behind Consequently, South Africa's interests and objectives 
in the Southern African region are guided by the existence of strong linkages between the 
domestic and regional economy. In addition, a disaggregation of South Africa's trade to the 
Southern African Development Community (SAD C), reveals that Zimbabwe is her most 
important market (www.gov.zaJyearbookJeconomy.htm).Itis therefore not surprising that the 
rand's dramatic fall against the US Dollar in 2000 was generally ascribed to the turmoil in 
Zimbabwe. Reserve Bank governor, Tito Mboweni, pointed out that the deteriorating economic 
and political situation in Zimbabwe has affected the mood of investors in South African markets 
(Southscan, 5 May 2000: 68). A DF A's employee explained the predicament in terms of a useful 
analogy: just as the squalid conditions of a neighbour's property reduces the value of a 
beautifully kept house so too foreign investors do not see chaos in Zimbabwe, but chaos in 
Africa; not war in the DRC but war in Africa (Interview A, appendix 1). 
Nelson Mandela has argued that South Africa cannot escape its African destiny and it is in her 
own interest to play a role on the African continent generally and specifically in the regional 
context (pahad, 1996: 8). Aziz Pahad concurs that without peace and stability at home and in 
the rest of Africa, economic growth and development will be subverted (Pahad, 1996: 8). 
Consequently, South Africa's foreign policy for the Southern African region is supposed to 
reflect a commitment to close diplomatic, economic, and security co-operation and integration, 
adherence to human rights, the promotion of democracy, and the preservation of regional 
solidarity, peace and stability (www.gov.zaJyearbookJforeignrelations.htm). South Africa's 
approach to achieving these aims whilst simultaneously preserving her national interests was 
criticized as being weak and docile. True, South Africa's approach did not yield the results 
desired by her western critics (a return to the status quo for white farmers and the purging of 
Mugabe), but whether this was actually an awful thing is debatable. 
South Africa has opted for a policy of 'quiet diplomacy' and 'constructive engagement' in 
response to the Zimbabwean crisis. In the past, Alfred Nzo had stated that actions by the 
Mugabe government against journalists and others was a domestic matter and South Africa 
would not involve itself in it (Muller, 1999: 17, electronic version). Nevertheless, it was noted 
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that this did not exclude 'quiet diplomacy' and more private attempts to work for human rights 
and democratic ideals. South African foreign policy makers theorized that a discreet approach 
would be less likely to provoke its volatile neighbour with its "sensitive" president4 than the loud 
insults emanating from Britain and the rest of the western world. It is suggested that the 
Zimbabwe situation has been exaggerated, especially by Britain which has taken offence to 
President Mugabe's intemperate use oflanguage (especially his unwise homophobic remarks, 
among others). Punishing Mugabe for being undiplomatic, by treating him as the next Idi Amin, 
is perhaps harsh. "Amin would never have held a referendum on his constitutional proposals, 
let alone allow himself to lose it. Amin would have also fed Morgan Tsvangirai, leader of the 
opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), to crocodiles long before he turned his 
trade unions into a political party."(Duodu, 2000: 1, electronic version). 
Nonetheless, South Africa's 'quietly, quietly' approach draws fire that Pretoria is not doing 
enough to stop the Zimbabwe crisis from further damaging the regional economy. However, 
South African policy makers are looking ahead at the bigger picture and the country's long term 
national interests. Disrupting Harare-Pretoria relations would lose South Africa what little 
leverage it has in the DRC war. Former Botswana president, Ketumile Masire, who was given 
the role of mediating between the warring sides in the DRC, declared that Mugabe could play 
"the most decisive role in resolving the conflict, since it was the presence of his army that 
sustains the present situation" (Southern Africa Monthly Regional Bulletin, April 2000: 6). 
Pretoria's leverage is further limited by its belief that Mugabe's ZANU-PF remains the only 
viable guarantor of stability in Zimbabwe. The opposition MDC, a youthful party of trade 
unionists, human rights activists, academics, and some business owners, is regarded as utilizing 
a coalition formula that went terribly wrong with Frederick Chiluba's Movement for Multi-Party 
Democracy in Zambia (Africa Confidential, 7 July 2000: 1). 
4 Interview A, appendix 1: "President Mugabe is a very sensitive person who does not take 
kindly to public criticism. If you attack him through the media or openly you will not get 
positive results. The deterioration ofthe relationship between Britain and Zimbabwe was largely 
due to the activist position adopted by Tony Blair and Peter Hain. 
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Moreover, enthusiasm for a more visionary regional policy is tempered by a cautious approach 
to the thin line between leadership and hegemony. In 1999, a study by the Institute for Security 
Studies found that the intervention in Lesotho had left "a legacy of bitterness" towards South 
Africa (Southern Africa Monthly Regional Bulletin, April 2000: 4). IfMugabe appealed to other 
states for help against South Africa's 'bullying,' it would widen the nascent split in SADC. 
Therefore, it is in South Africa's national interest to prevent a situation whereby resentment and 
hostility emerge and grow as a result of actual or perceived domination of these countries by a 
more powerful South Africa. Thus far, the South African government's 'quiet diplomacy' has 
been buttressed with a parallel channel of engagement between the ruling ANC and its 
Zimbabwean counterpart, ZANU-PF. Mbeki has been talking to Mugabe regularly since the 
World Economic Forum meeting in Switzerland (Africa Confidential, 28 April 2000: 3). This 
silent diplomacy is aimed at averting an even bigger human tights crisis and it shows that the 
South African government is interested in negotiating a regional understanding, not dictating one. 
This contrasts with the dictatorial approach ofthe United States where the senate passed a bill-
the Zimbabwe Democracy Act of 2000 - setting the conditions for the sovereign state of 
Zimbabwe to follow in carrying out land reform (Sunday Times, 13 August 2000: 17). As a 
regional power, South Africa realizes the limits to that power and consequently relies more 
centrally on non-coercive instruments of foreign policy such as diplomacy, trade and economic 
co-operation. 
However, there is consternation that in South Africa the "pendulum may be swinging from 
domination towards doing nothing"(Calland and Weld, 1994: 9). The concern is that caution 
may lead to inertia. The African Commission on Human and People's Rights, in its 8th annual 
activity report (1994-1995), calls for an environment in which human rights may flourish but 
submits that the quiet diplomacy on the African continent has failed to create such an 
environment and has failed the many victims of abuse by African governments. For example, 
a South African member of the observer mission to Zimbabwe, intimated that "no one was 
prevented from casting their vote. Those who wanted to participate in the election did so, and 
importantly voted for the party of their choice" (The Natal Witness, 15 September 2000). 
However, some critics later claimed that 25% of registered voters were in fact dead, and that 
doctored voter rolls and Mugabe-designed constituency boundaries were finalised a mere three 
weeks before the election and released to the opposition only by court order (Rotberg, 2000: 48). 
sa 
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However, it can be argued that the difficulty in applying a human rights-based foreign policy to 
the Zimbabwean situation lies in the dual nature of the rights in question. On the one hand, the 
"arbitrary amendment of the constitution" and the occupation of white-owned farms indicate a 
"clear violation of civil and political rights of white Zimbabwean farmers" (Rotberg, 2000: 48). 
On the other hand, one could argue not only that many of the targeted farms were acquired 
immorally but also that the socioeconomic deprivation ofthe black Zimbabwean community has 
been ignored for too long. An article in Zimbabwe' s Herald newspaper elucidated that "we have 
the right to vote and engage in politics without participating meaningfully in the economy"(8 
December 1997: 4, electronic version). This conflict between the rights claimed by white 
farmers and black veterans is a microcosm of the larger conflict between political and 
socioeconomic rights. Contradictory as it may seem, a high degree of pragmatism is required in 
pursuing a didactic foreign policy based on human rights. Under the circumstances, South 
Africa's quiet diplomacy which cautiously refrained from taking sides was probably the best 
option both in terms of her need to preserve national economic interests and her aspiration to 
promote human rights. After all, an effective and judicious foreign policy should include not just 
a concern for the respect for human rights but also its various manifestations in terms of civil, 




Evaluating South African Foreign Policy 
This analysis has not aimed at being exhaustive. It has selected key issues to illustrate the need 
to articulate more clearly the objectives of South Africa's foreign policy. An attempt has also 
been made to denote the complexities relating to the application, in contemporary international 
relations, of general principles such as human rights. 
In 1995, Nelson Mandela noted that the irony of South Africa's late entry into international 
affairs was that she could reap the fruits of a world redefining itself (South African Foreign 
Policy Discussion Document, 1996: 6). However, time has proved him wrong. Surviving in a 
competitive interdependent global system whilst vainly trying to maintain its commitment to 
human rights, justice, fair-play, and peace has been burdensome rather than rewarding for South 
Africa. Since the advent of democracy in 1994, domestic and international expectations have 
steadily grown regarding South Africa's role as a responsible and respected member of the 
international community. Indeed, the wider a state's foreign policy commitments, the more 
limited is its freedom of action in foreign policy. South Africa has learnt this the hard way. 
Although these external environmental restraints are not wholly determining, they do set narrow 
bounds to the foreign policy states ought to pursue. In addition they have to be balanced against 
domestic constraints. In South Africa, foreign policy perspectives have not been freed from the 
awesome and debilitating baggage of domestic concerns. 
The early optimism surrounding South Africa's pursuit of a foreign policy based on high moral 
principles, specifically the promotion and preservation of human rights, was blinded by the tragic 
character of political and social problems bequeathed by the apartheid regime. South Africa's 
first priority was to ensure that she would be able to compete on the global playing field in her 
own right, thus guaranteeing the security and well-being of her own citizens. However, South 
Africa's remarkable transition from political pariah to pedagogue has resulted in a set of onerous 
international obligations even as it is also expected to act in concert with other actors in pursuit 
of diverse bilateral, multilateral and regional expectations. The two are undoubtedly 
interdependent but, unless South Africa is effectively able to manage its own transition to an 
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outward-orientated, internationally competitive economy, its relatively new role of international 
mediator will not be sustainable. South African foreign policy makers have come to realize that 
'bread and butter' survival issues (preservation of the national economy in a competitive, 
interdependent international arena) take precedence over the 'niceties' of human rights 
protection. 
Most modem ideologies are infinitely malleable and one would expect the calculation of national 
interest and ideological prescription to march hand in hand (Goodwin, 1974: 172). Despite this, 
South Africa's approach to foreign policy shows that if a sharp breach occurs between interest 
and political creed, the former generally wins out for the simple reason that the state must survive 
and somehow prosper. An employee at the DTI reluctantly admitted that human rights was 
compromised globally in order to alleviate the economic situation at home (Interview D, 
appendix 1). This makes for an unhealthy foreign policy: a failure to uphold human rights could 
mean that a democratic South Africa would unintentionally send into the region what Susan 
George has called 'boomerangs' - "actions or inactions by a more developed country with 
negative consequences for less developed countries, but which eventually rebound on the more 
advanced country in various negative ways," for example, through refugees (Davies et aI, 1993: 
60). 
It is important that foreign policy makers realize that "the choice is not between bread or freedom 
but bread and freedom. "(Mills and Boulden, 1997: 2, electronic verSion).!: Clearly, there is a need 
for reconciliation between preserving national interests and promoting broader interests such as 
human rights if South Africa is to achieve a coherent foreign policy that is congruent with her 
external aspirations as well as the internal needs of her citizens. ' The first step towards achieving 
this, ideally, should involve an alteration of the perception that promoting/protecting human 
rights and preserving national interests are parallel goals which never intersect. Picturing 
principles and interests at opposite poles can inhibit the development of a foreign policy that 
takes cognizance of both higher aspirations and mandatory needs. Winston Churchill explained 
that the identity between collectivist internationalism and British nationalism existed because 
Britain's national interest coincided with the interests of humanity and civilization: "the fortunes 
of the British Empire and its glory are inseparably interwoven into the fortunes of the world. We 
rise or we fall together" (Wolfers, 1967: 273). South Africa should draw on Britain's experience 
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and harmonize her national interest with international concerns. In this sense, promoting broad 
values such as human rights and democracy will become important components of South Africa's 
national interest. 
The case studies have shown that one of the most basic reasons for establishing diplomatic 
relations with countries accused of human rights violations, is to create a channel of 
communication which is then used to convey to the government ofthat country the values which 
South Africa promotes and propagates. This approach is derived from the belief that 
communication and persuasion would be more constructive than isolation. Nevertheless, as the 
China case so aptly illustrates, in an era where economic welfare is a prime national value, acting 
on one's conscience is not always meritorious. Whether we refer to the diplomatic recognition 
of China, our relations with Zimbabwe, the Atlantis Diesel Engine deal with Cuba or oil 
arrangement s with Iran, South Africa will need to use all of its diplomatic savoir faire to balance 
the interests it has in dealing with the more 'pariah' countries whilst simultaneously maintaining 
its moral high grounds (Kuper, 1997: 259). 
It is advised that the DF A would be less criticised if it were to take the public more fully into its 
confidence over the difficulties and constraints that condition it actions regarding states 
practising human rights violations. Of course, sections ofthe public may still not agree with the 
choices, but public perceptions will be better informed if we all know why the government acts 
as it does and what criteria have informed its choices. South Africa can make a valuable 
contribution to the international system of the new millennium, but only if it is prepared to make 
some hard policy choices on human rights questions. At present, there is a tendency to harp on 
values such as prestige without recognising that they can only be earned by our success in 
managing our affairs and in gaining the respect of others, and that they cannot be bolstered by 
mere words or gestures. In South Africa, there is a predisposition to treat the political and 
economic aspects of foreign policy separately. "I would be hesitant to comment on human rights 
because that is not something related to DTI's function. It is a difficult issue to address within 
a trade context," is a typical response at the DTI on the issue of human rights (Interview D, 
appendix 1). The dangers of this are exemplified by the fact that often particular trade interests 
are seen as incompatible with certain principles and values inherent in South Africa's foreign 
policy. The task of diplomacy is to reconcile or explain divergent interests, to appropriate 
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external actors or to bring trade policy in line with foreign policy (Barston, 1988: 159). One 
should acknowledge that trade cannot only be used for economic objectives but also political 
ones. However, it needs to be realized that this is not in itself a strategy for realizing obj ectives. 
It is proposed that South Africa's foreign policy initiatives be modest and not overly ambitious. 
Economic obj ectives and political ideology can be balanced. Forging a new foreign policy is not 
about changing internal values, elevating national interests, or sacrificing Icompromising external 
values; it is about rethinking what South Africa can offer the world. It is easier to argue for the 
morality of politics if one does not have to bear the responsibility of choice and decision. 
Although the means can frequently eat away or corrode the ends of foreign policy, unless or until 
South Africa, as a matter of deliberate policy-planning, begins to broaden or redefine interests 
and aspirations, the contradiction between substance and form that lies at the heart of South 
Africa's external relations will remain. In order for South Africa not to end up with an insolvent 
foreign policy, it will have to define and prioritise its objectives and take cognizance of its own 
limitations as well as the nature of the world outside. It has been pointed out that we need a 
reappraisal of content as well as packaging, "neither old wine in new bottles nor new wine in old 
bottles" will suffice (Evans, 1991: 6). 
We need to think like idealists in the search for ideas of what an alternative world might look 
like; yet, we need to think like realists in the sense of asking whether favourable human rights 
conditions that already exist in some economically advanced countries might be extended to their 
less economically advanced counterparts. There is an intriguing but daunting possibility that 
stable peace, economic equality, decent living conditions, and political liberties may be bound 
together in an inseparable package; thus, to strive for one may require us to strive for them all. 
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,qPPCN~JX I: 
During the course of this year (2000), a series of interviews (both personal and telephonic) 
were conducted with officials from the relevant branches of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and the Department of Trade and Industry. Information was provided on condition 
of anonymity. 
A. Personal interview with an official from the Zimbabwe Desk of the Africa Branch of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria - 12 September 2000 
B. Personal interview with officials from the Social Affairs Branch ofthe Multilateral Division 
of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria - 12 September 2000 
C. Telephonic interview with a representative from the Asia and Oceania Branch of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs, on behalf of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs - 13 
September 2000 
D. Personal interview with an official from the Foreign Trade Relations Branch of the 
Department of Trade and Industry - 12 September 2000 
E. Personal interview with an official from the Africa Trade Relations Branch of the 
Department of Trade and Industry - 12 September 2000 
F. Personal interview with an official from the Bilateral Trade Relations Branch of the 
Department of Trade and Industry - 12 September 2000 
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IlPPCN:b!JX.2 : 
Likert Scale Measuring Commitment to Human Rights 
Please respond with regard to South African Foreign Policy 
strongly agree agree disagree strongly disagree 
1. Human rights issues are important to foreign policy. 
2. The promotion of national economic interests should 
take precedence over the promotion of human rights issues. 
3. Given the potential economic benefits to South Africa, the 
sale of arms to DRC rebels should be considered seriously by 
the SA government. 
4. Promoting/Protecting human rights should be the primary 
aim of foreign policy. 
5. Promoting human rights has ideological significance but 
is not practical. 
6. Preserving national economic interests should be at the 
heart of foreign policy. 
7. South African economic interests in Angola should not take 
precedence over human rights considerations. 
8. Promoting national economic interests above universal 
values such as human rights is selfish. 
Key: 
Sa a d 
Ql 4 3 2 
Q2 I 2 3 
Q3 I 2 3 
Q4 4 3 2 
Q5 1 2 3 
Q6 1 2 3 
Q7 4 3 2 










(Sa) (a) (d) (Sd) 
* Questions 1,4, 7, and 8 indicate that human rights are central to foreign policy and are scored Sa = 
4, a = 3, d = 2, and Sd = 1 whereas questions 2,3,5, and 6 allude the opposite and are scored Sa = 1, 
a = 2, d = 3, and Sd = 4. 
